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Law for the Platform Economy 
Julie E. Cohen* 
This Article explores patterns of legal-institutional change in the 
emerging, platform-driven economy. Its starting premise is that the 
platform is not simply a new business model, a new social technology, or a 
new infrastructural formation (although it is also all of those things). 
Rather, it is the core organizational form of the emerging informational 
economy. Platforms do not enter or expand markets; they replace (and 
rematerialize) them. The article argues that legal institutions, including 
both entitlements and regulatory institutions, have systematically 
facilitated the platform economy’s emergence. It first describes the 
evolution of the platform as a mode of economic (re)organization and 
introduces the ways that platforms restructure both economic exchange 
and patterns of information flow more generally. It then explores some of 
the ways that actions and interventions by and on behalf of platform 
businesses are reshaping the landscape of legal entitlements and 
obligations. Finally, it describes challenges that platform-based 
intermediation of the information environment has posed for existing 
regulatory institutions and traces some of the emerging institutional 
responses. 
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Platforms are big news and big business — and, some would say, the 
focus of overblown and unwarranted hype. Books by business scholars 
and tech-economy pundits tout the efficiency and generativity of 
platform-based business models, even though new platform ventures 
often struggle to turn profits after moving out of the startup phase. 
Tech journalists, activists, and scholars in a variety of academic fields 
argue that platforms are reshaping seemingly every area of human 
endeavor, from innovation to commerce to cultural production to 
social organization, but disagree on how to assess platforms’ effects. 
This Article takes claims about the transformativeness of platforms 
seriously and considers their implications for law. Its starting premise 
is that the platform is not simply a new business model, a new social 
technology, or a new infrastructural formation (although it is also all 
of those things). Rather, it is the core organizational form of the 
emerging informational economy. 
In the book in progress from which this Article is adapted, I frame the 
emergence of informational capitalism in terms of three large-scale 
developments that parallel those identified by political economist Karl 
Polanyi as framing the emergence of industrial capitalism.1 Polanyi 
mapped a “great transformation” in the system of political economy that 
involved appropriation of newly important resources but that also 
moved on conceptual and organizational levels. The basic factors of 
industrial production — land, labor, and money — were 
reconceptualized as commodities, while at the same time patterns of 
barter and exchange became detached from local communities and 
reembedded in the constructed mechanism of the market.2 Three 
analogous shifts frame the transformation that is now underway: the 
propertization of intangible resources, the concurrent dematerialization 
and datafication of the basic factors of industrial production, and the 
embedding of patterns of barter and exchange within information 
platforms. Organizationally speaking, the platform is key: platforms do 
not enter or expand markets; they replace (and rematerialize) them. 
 
 1 JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (forthcoming). For a concise definition of informational 
capitalism, see MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: THE RISE OF THE NETWORK 
SOCIETY 14-18 (1996). For helpful discussions of various manifestations of the shift 
from industrialism to informationalism as the dominant mode of economic 
development, see generally DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A 
VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973); JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986); DAN 
SCHILLER, HOW TO THINK ABOUT INFORMATION 3-35 (2007). 
 2 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 33-76 (Beacon Press 2d ed. 2001) (1944). 
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And platforms, unlike the fictional “market,” have taken shape as 
discrete legal entities, with their own aims and agendas. 
The role of law in this story is foundational but largely unremarked. 
Legal scholars who work on information policy have been intensely 
concerned with questions about how existing doctrinal and regulatory 
frameworks should apply to information, databases, technical 
protocols, and online behavior, perhaps undergoing some changes in 
coverage or emphasis along the way. For the most part, they have not 
asked the broader, reflexive questions about how core legal 
institutions are already evolving in response to the ongoing 
transformation in our political economy — questions, in other words, 
not about how law should apply to disputes over information, but 
rather about how disputes over information are reshaping the 
enterprise of law at the institutional level. That is a mistake. Law for 
the platform economy is already being written — not via discrete, 
purposive changes, but rather via the ordinary, uncoordinated but self-
interested efforts of information-economy participants and the lawyers 
and lobbyists they employ. 
Part I describes the evolution of the platform as a mode of economic 
(re)organization and introduces the ways that platforms restructure 
both economic exchange and patterns of information flow more 
generally. Part II explores some of the ways that actions and 
interventions by and on behalf of platform businesses are reshaping 
the landscape of legal entitlements and obligations. Part III describes 
challenges that platform-based intermediation of the information 
environment has posed for existing regulatory institutions and traces 
some of the emerging institutional responses. Part IV concludes and 
suggests some lessons for the project of “future-proofing law.” 
I. FROM MARKETS TO PLATFORMS 
In the industrial-era economy, the locus for activities of barter and 
exchange was the market, an idealized site of encounter between 
buyers and sellers within which the characteristics, quantities, and 
prices of goods and services were regulated autonomically by the laws 
of supply and demand. In the emerging informational economy, the 
locus for those activities is the platform, a site of encounter where 
interactions are materially and algorithmically intermediated. 
Platforms — including online marketplaces, desktop and mobile 
computing environments, social networks, virtual labor exchanges, 
payment systems, trading systems, and many, many more — have 
become the sites of ever-increasing amounts of economic activity and 
also of ever-increasing amounts of social and cultural activity. The 
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emergence of platform-based business models has reshaped work, 
finance, information transmission, entertainment, social interaction, 
and consumption of goods and services, and has destabilized the 
locally embedded systems that previously mediated those activities in 
many different types of communities. Legal and economic constructs 
based on the idea of “markets” — whether in goods and services or in 
speech and ideas — have yet to adapt in response. 
A. Prologue: Access and Legibility 
No form of economic or social organization is ever wholly new. 
Preexisting modes of organization impose their own logics, and path-
dependencies matter. It is important to begin by recognizing two 
important ways in which platforms represent continuity. The 
intertwined functions that platforms provide — intermediation that 
provides would-be counterparties with access to one another and 
techniques for rendering users legible to those seeking to market goods 
and services to them — have important antecedents in twentieth-
century direct marketing and advertising practices. 
To understand the pre-history of platforms, it is useful to consider 
two early precursors: the Sears, Roebuck catalog and the Nielsen 
ratings system. Over two decades at the turn of the twentieth century, 
entrepreneurs Richard Sears and Alvah Curtis Roebuck parlayed a 
mail-order watch and jewelry business into a wildly successful mail-
order empire selling everything from jewelry to farm equipment. 
Inclusion of a product in the Sears, Roebuck catalog gave its 
manufacturer access to a marketing juggernaut with the ability to 
reach consumers nationwide, the range to offer concert grant pianos 
and engraved shotguns, and the power to undercut the prices charged 
by local “five-and-ten-cent stores” for everyday essentials.3 Three 
decades later, Arthur Nielsen, a pioneer in the field of statistical 
market research, began to develop a system designed to give 
subscribing advertisers and their clients a different kind of access to 
consumers, based on aggregate measurements rather than solely on 
one-way communication. The system originated as a simple 
“audimeter” that recorded when household radios were on and the 
stations to which they were tuned; over time, the company expanded 
to television and developed techniques for correlating the recorded 
information with demographic information and individual viewing 
information collected from participating households via paper 
 
 3 See BORIS EMMET & JOHN E. JUECK, CATALOGUES AND COUNTERS: A HISTORY OF 
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY 59-99, 100-13 (1950). 
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“diaries.”4 In this manner, it gradually began to develop more granular 
profiles of the viewing population. 
Both the Sears, Roebuck catalog and the Nielsen ratings system 
provided access to vast pools of consumers, but the ways they 
provided access and the relationships they envisioned between and 
among manufacturers, intermediaries, and consumers were different. 
To use Dan Bouk’s periodization, the catalog represents the era of the 
ideal customer as social imaginary. Sears, Roebuck & Co. lacked and 
likely could not imagine collecting precise, granular information about 
customer desires and resources, so it sold products it envisioned 
customers as wanting.5 To the extent that measurements factored into 
those determinations, they did so as proxies for the ideal customer 
rather than as empirical representations of any particular customer. 
The Nielsen system represents the era of the mass audience, 
constructed on the basis of numerical aggregates that purported to 
represent the audience itself.6 The era of the mass audience also 
represents a critical inflection point, in which the legibility rubric 
supplied by an intermediary became both an object of regularized 
economic exchange and an increasingly powerful, institutionalized 
arbiter of the knowledge upon which market participants relied. 
Legibility here connotes more than simple visibility; legibility rubrics 
incorporate both implicit epistemologies and associated action 
strategies. Like other such rubrics — for example, the charts and 
tables on which modern administrators rely to govern populations or 
the nodes and landmarks on which city dwellers rely to create 
cognitive maps of their surroundings7 — the Nielsen ratings did not 
simply represent the mass audience but also encoded both a way of 
understanding it and strategies for managing it. 
Platforms echo some aspects of these early precursors, but also 
rework the basic themes of access and legibility in ways that neither 
 
 4 See HUGH MALCOLM BEVILLE, JR., AUDIENCE RATINGS: RADIO, TELEVISION, CABLE 
34-38, 70-75 (2d rev. ed. 1988); JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS 
AND THE NEW MEDIA WORLD 24-32 (1997). 
 5 See EMMET & JUECK, supra note 3, at 39-40; Dan Bouk, The History and Political 
Economy of Personal Data over the Last Two Centuries in Three Acts, 32 OSIRIS 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 11-13) (on file with author). 
 6 See Bouk, supra note 5, at 12-16. On television ratings as a technology of power, 
see generally IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 53-57 (1991). 
 7 For foundational explications of the ways that legibility rubrics both assist and 
distort understanding in the contexts of state administration and urban planning, see 
generally KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY (1960); JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A 
STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES FOR IMPROVING THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 
(1998). 
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Richard Sears nor Arthur Nielsen could have envisioned. Selection of 
one’s product for inclusion in the Sears, Roebuck catalog might have 
offered a ticket to marketplace success, but it was not essential for 
economic survival in an era in which much commerce remained local. 
Many manufacturers, moreover, refused the opportunity because of 
the production quantities demanded or because they feared that local 
retailers who opposed the spread of mail-order businesses would 
boycott their wares.8 Access to basic communications infrastructures 
— the postal system and print advertising distributed via newspapers 
and magazines — was becoming more nearly essential for survival, but 
the relevant infrastructures were available to (almost) anyone willing 
and able to pay the required fees. As the relevant infrastructures — 
now digital and networked — have become platforms, both the 
conditions of access and the need for access have changed. Access to 
the facilities offered by Amazon or Google or Visa/Mastercard or the 
iOS operating system, for example, requires assent to complex sets of 
legal and technical protocols. And access to platforms — whether 
online marketplaces or search engines or payment systems or 
computing environments — is increasingly essential to reaching any 
customers at all. 
The story of legibility is more complicated still. In the late 1980s, 
proprietary infrastructures for radio and television broadcast began to 
give way to a far more complex ecosystem that included proprietary 
infrastructures for cable television and Internet access and open 
protocols for Internet publishing. The proliferation of cable channels 
and home video recording technologies initially caused an existential 
crisis for advertisers, whose aggregate measures of the mass audience 
and its tastes began to dissolve into seemingly unmanageable 
fragments.9 That fragmentation, however, also lent momentum to 
practices of targeted marketing that had originated earlier in the 
twentieth century, and that were premised on the importance of 
reaching specialized pools of desirable consumers.10 New technologies 
for networked digital communication were emerging, and efforts to 
adapt those technologies for commercial exploitation ultimately 
produced new, highly granular ways of measuring audiences and 
predicting audience appeal.11 
 
 8 See EMMET & JUECK, supra note 3, at 117-19, 150-68.  
 9 See ANG, supra note 6, at 68-77. 
 10 See TUROW, supra note 4, at 27-36. 
 11 See Bouk, supra note 5, at 17-20. 
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At the same time, and reflecting the increasing normative force of 
legibility as an overarching frame for commercial endeavor, the 
legibility function began to burrow into the core of the infrastructure 
itself. The emergence of the commercial Internet, with its enormous 
number and variety of information sources, accelerated the centripetal 
movement. A world with a vast diversity of information sources 
required intermediation for those sources to be meaningfully 
accessible, and legibility became the essential function for an 
intermediary to provide to advertisers seeking access to users. 
B. How Platforms Shape Information Flow, part 1: The Datafication of 
Everyday Life 
Reorganization around intermediation and legibility has engendered 
profound structural changes in the architecture of contemporary 
networked communication. Platforms emerged at a point of fortuitous 
technological convergence: new techniques for customer tracking, 
immersive social design, and data analysis all promised new 
possibilities for profiting from targeted marketing in an increasingly 
fragmented media ecosystem. As legibility became a service most 
effectively and profitably provided at the infrastructural level, 
however, the demands of the platform business model rapidly began to 
drive infrastructure design. As a result of that shift, the everyday lives 
of network users have become increasingly datafied — converted into 
structured flows of data suitable for continuous collection and analysis 
at the platform level. 
One important technological predicate for the emergence of 
platforms emerged in the mid-1990s, when researchers at the Netscape 
Corporation developed the first protocol for identifying visitors to web 
sites. The protocol, which involved insertion of a small piece of code 
called a “cookie” into the user’s browser, enabled so-called “stateful” 
interactions, such as transactions involving use of a virtual shopping 
cart. Implemented in “persistent” form, it also could enable 
reidentification of those users when they returned to the site later 
on.12 The resulting radical democratization of surveillance capability 
marks a critical inflection point in the pursuit of user legibility. Using 
cookie technology, anyone with a server connected to the Internet 
could become a data collector, and cookies also could be served and 
collected by third parties providing hosting, payment, or marketing 
services. Willingness to accept at least some kinds of cookies rapidly 
 
 12 See David M. Kristol, HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics, 1 ACM 
TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 151, 152-56 (2001). 
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became an increasingly necessary precondition for transacting online 
and participating in online communities. In addition, marketers and 
technologists in their employ developed a set of less-visible tracking 
techniques, known variously as “clear GIFs” or “web bugs,” for 
surreptitiously collecting information about Internet users’ behavior.13 
In parallel with these developments, new platform-based 
environments for social sharing and massively multiplayer gaming 
were taking shape in ways that also relied on techniques for keeping 
track of users. The earliest online communities were organized around 
chat rooms, listservs, and communal bulletin boards, and had neither 
the desire nor the capability for built-in surveillance. In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, however, the first true multimedia gaming platforms 
and social networking platforms began to emerge: graphically rich, 
hypertext-based environments that enabled customizable member 
profiles and relied on cookies to manage login information.14 
At the same time, a variety of firms — including emerging platform 
firms, digital advertising specialty firms, and data brokers — were 
developing new and powerful data analysis capabilities. Those 
capabilities combined new configurations of information-processing 
hardware capable of sifting, sorting, and interrogating vast quantities 
of data in very short times with new machine learning techniques for 
identifying patterns, distilling the patterns into predictions, and 
continually adjusting the patterns and predictions in response to new 
data.15 The result, popularized under the moniker “Big Data,” was a 
technique for converting voluminous, heterogeneous flows of 
physical, transactional, and behavioral information about people (or 
about anything else) into a particular, highly data-intensive type of 
knowledge.16 
 
 13 See Richard M. Smith, The Web Bug FAQ, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 11, 
1999), https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Marketing/web_bug.html. 
 14 See TRISTAN DONOVAN, REPLAY: THE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES 289-319 (2010); 
Benjamin Hale, The History of Social Media, HISTORY COOP. (June 16, 2015), http:// 
historycooperative.org/the-history-of-social-media; The History of Social Networking, 
DIG. TRENDS (May 14, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-
history-of-social-networking. 
 15 See generally Dave Feinleib, The 3 I’s of Big Data, FORBES (July 9, 2012, 4:05 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davefeinleib/2012/07/09/the-3-is-of-big-data; Jeff 
Kelly, Big Data: Hadoop, Business Analytics and Beyond, WIKIBON (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Big_Data:_Hadoop,_Business_Analytics_and_Beyond. 
 16 See generally JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, BIG DATA: THE 
NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2011); Ibrar Yaqoob 
et al., Big Data: From Beginning to Future, 36 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 1231 (2016); Gil 
Press, A Very Short History of Big Data, FORBES (May 9, 2013, 9:45 AM), 
https://onforb.es/16jHac8 (last updated Dec. 21, 2013). 
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The platform business model emerged as these developments 
converged with one another and with the demands of capital markets. 
As they moved beyond the startup phase and sought stable sources of 
financing, new ventures in search, social networking, gaming, content 
provision, day trading, freelance work referral, and other areas 
gradually became entangled within commercial and extractive logics. 
Advertisers who might provide revenue wanted results and users were 
learning to value personalization. Personalized tracking and predictive 
modeling seemed the logical way to satisfy both imperatives. 
Although many platform-based businesses have failed, when judged 
in aggregate, the platform business model is an undeniable 
commercial success. Google and Facebook together now command 
approximately 20% of global advertising revenue, 65% of digital 
advertising revenue, and 85% of every new dollar spent on 
advertising.17 The dominant platform firms — Alphabet (Google), 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft — have a combined market 
capitalization that (as of this writing) exceeds $3.5 trillion.18 Although 
the dominant platform firms are all publicly traded companies, the 
relationships between platform firms and private flows of finance 
capital are also deep and complex.19 
The commercial and extractive logics that drove emergence of the 
platform business model success now impose their own design 
imperatives, which demand continued evolution of the networked 
information environment toward ever more pervasive intermediation 
 
 17 See Lucy Handley, Google and Facebook Take 20 Percent of Total Global Ad Spend, 
Top List of World’s Largest Media Owners, CNBC (May 2, 2017, 8:46 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/02/google-and-facebook-take-20-percent-of-total-global-
ad-spend.html; Matthew Ingram, How Google and Facebook Have Taken Over the Digital 
Ad Industry, FORTUNE (Jan. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/04/google-facebook-ad-
industry; Peter Kafka, Google and Facebook Are Booming. Is the Rest of the Digital Ad 
Business Sinking?, RECODE (Nov. 2, 2016, 1:55 PM), https://www.recode.net/2016/ 
11/2/13497376/google-facebook-advertising-shrinking-iab-dcn. 
 18 See AAPL, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl [https:// 
perma.cc/6SDZ-VQFM] ($805,538,280,000); AMZN, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http:// 
www.nasdaq.com/symbol/amzn [https://perma.cc/LGK3-33UW] ($480,972,978,949); FB, 
NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/fb [https://perma.cc/8L9N-S94N] 
($442,928,382,963); GOOG, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/goog 
[https://perma.cc/RU8L-Z6ZX] ($673,209,740,440); GOOGL, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/googl [https://perma.cc/3KGJ-58AB] ($687,504,656,146); 
MSFT, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/msft [https://perma.cc/ 
TE7T-3XVJ] ($550,086,674,584). 
 19 See generally Martin Kenney, Explaining the Growth and Globalization of 
Silicon Valley: The Past and Today (Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
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and datafication.20 Those imperatives have shaped the emergence of 
smart mobile devices, wearable computing, and the Internet of things, 
dictating implementations that emphasize seamless tracking, fine-
grained measurement of patterns of behavior and attention, extraction 
of continuous flows of data, and configuration of data flows into forms 
best suited to analysis and commercial exploitation.21 As a result of 
these interdependent marketplace and infrastructural shifts, 
commercial information collection has become a nearly continuous 
condition. Communications networks have gradually been 
transformed into sensing networks, organized around always-on 
mobile devices that collect and transmit highly granular streams of 
structured information via proprietary interfaces and protocols to 
powerful, proprietary machine learning systems. Put differently, 
networked media infrastructures have become pervasively 
platformized.22 
C. A Platform Is Not (Just) a Network 
Over the past several decades, scholars in a wide variety of fields have 
identified networks and infrastructures as important organizing 
concepts for studying the information economy. In some discussions of 
the information economy, the terms “network,” “infrastructure,” and 
“platform” are used interchangeably, but platforms are not the same as 
networks, nor are they simply infrastructures. Platforms represent 
infrastructure-based strategies for introducing friction into networks. In 
theory, the twenty-first century communications infrastructure still 
known as the Internet is “open,” and for some purposes, that 
characterization is accurate. For most practical purposes, however, the 
“network of networks” is becoming a network of platforms; Internet 
access and use are intermediated from beginning to end. 
A network is a mode of organization in which hubs and nodes 
structure the flows of transactions and interactions. Network 
organization is not a unique property of digital information and 
communications networks; rather, as network scientists have shown, 
such networks simply make visible a latent characteristic of the many 
 
 20 See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 73-97 (2013); 
Jose Van Dijck, Datafication, Dataism, and Dataveillance: Big Data Between Scientific 
Paradigm and Ideology, 12 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 197 (2014). 
 21 See generally Anne Helmond, The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data 
Platform Ready, SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, July-Dec. 2015, at 1. 
 22 See generally Jean-Christophe Plantin et al., Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform 
Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y, 2016, at 1. 
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human activities that rely on communication and interconnection.23 
Digital information and communications networks do, however, 
reduce many of the costs and lag times formerly associated with such 
activities. In addition, participants in networks reap generalized 
benefits (network externalities24) as those networks grow in size and 
scale, and the relatively low costs of digital interconnection have 
enabled digital networks to become very large. 
Infrastructures are shared resources that facilitate downstream 
production of other goods.25 Roads and electric power grids, for 
example, play essential roles as inputs into a variety of downstream 
goods, as do less tangible resources like linguistic and scientific 
conventions. Notably, infrastructures may be managed as commons 
but need not be: some infrastructures, such as the interbank wire 
transfer system, are club goods financed and controlled by their 
members; others, such as local electric power suppliers, are managed 
as utilities and financed based on metered consumption charges; and 
still others, including facilities for Internet access in most countries, 
are privately provided but subject to various regulatory obligations. 
Digital information and communications technologies function both 
as infrastructures and as networks. As scholars in fields ranging from 
industrial organization to geography to media and communications 
studies have shown, the forms of connectivity they provide have 
reshaped seemingly every area of human activity.26 
Platforms exploit the affordances of network organization and 
supply infrastructures that facilitate particular types of interactions, 
but they also represent strategies for bounding networks and 
privatizing and controlling infrastructures. They operate with the goal 
of making clusters of transactions and relationships stickier — sticky 
enough to adhere to the platform despite participants’ theoretical 
ability to exit and look elsewhere for other intermediation options. To 
accomplish that goal, platforms must provide services that participants 
view as desirable and empowering, thereby generating and enabling 
participants to leverage network externalities. But they also must 
 
 23 See generally ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED (2014). 
 24 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994). 
 25 See generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF 
SHARED RESOURCES 61-114 (2012). 
 26 See, e.g., CASTELLS, supra note 1; GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES (Saskia 
Sassen ed., 2002); JOSE VAN DIJCK, THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY 
OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2013); Laurel Smith-Doerr & Walter W. Powell, Networks and 
Economic Life, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 379 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
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thwart certain other kinds of networking that might facilitate defection 
to rival platforms. 
Platforms use technical protocols and centralized control to define 
networked spaces in which users can conduct a heterogeneous array of 
activities and to structure those spaces for ease of use. The vehicle for 
managing the tensions between heterogeneity and ease of use is 
modularity; platform protocols impose a modular structure that 
enables certain types of flexibility but at the same time forecloses 
others. Protocol-based control also enables intermediation and 
facilitates legibility, allowing the platform to serve its own priorities.27 
In Tarleton Gillespie’s formulation, the term “platform” appears to 
offer users a “raised, level surface” on which to present themselves, 
but at the same time it elides the necessary work of defining and 
policing the platform’s edges.28 Platform protocols perform a double 
function, affording access but also points of contact for exercises of 
technological and political authority. The latter power is one that the 
fictionalized construct of the market lacked, and it comprehensively 
reshapes the conditions of economic exchange. 
D. How Platforms Shape Economic Exchange 
Economically speaking, platforms represent both horizontal and 
vertical strategies for extracting the surplus value of user data.29 
Because that goal requires large numbers of users generating large 
amounts of data, the platform provider’s goal is to become and remain 
the indispensable point of intermediation for parties in its target 
markets. Commentators have begun to puzzle over the implications of 
the dominance and staggering market capitalization of the largest 
platform firms.30 The characteristic “rich-get-richer” pattern of 
network organization, however, militates in favor of the emergence of 
 
 27 See Plantin et al., supra note 22, at 5-9; see also Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of 
‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347 (2010). 
 28 Gillespie, supra note 27, at 358-59; see also Jonas Andersson Schwarz, Platform 
Logic: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Platform-Based Economy, POL’Y & INT. 4-13 
(Aug. 3, 2017) (DOI: 10.1002/poi3.159). 
 29 Cf. MARK ANDREJEVIC, ISPY: SURVEILLANCE AND POWER IN THE INTERACTIVE ERA 
(2007); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an 
Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 78-80 (2015). See generally NICK 
SRNICEK, PLATFORM CAPITALISM (2017); DANIEL TROTTIER, SOCIAL MEDIA AS 
SURVEILLANCE: RETHINKING VISIBILITY IN A CONVERGING WORLD (2012). 
 30 See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, Silicon Valley’s Big Three vs. Detroit’s Golden-Age 
Big Three, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2017/05/silicon-valley-big-three/527838. 
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dominant platforms, and platform firms also have devised a variety of 
other strategies for attaining and maintaining dominance, each 
targeting multiple user groups.31 
To begin with, platforms both enable and benefit from competitive 
dynamics of economic exchange that differ in profoundly important 
ways from those of traditional, one-sided markets. The exchanges 
constituted by platforms are two- or multi-sided: they serve buyers, 
the sellers seeking to reach them, and often advertisers seeking the 
buyers’ attention. Because the platform forms relationships with 
members of each group separately, it can define the terms of each 
relationship differently.32 So, for example, it can charge little or 
nothing to participants on one side of a target market and make its 
profit on another side. A dominant platform can reduce prices to one 
group — for example, book buyers or consumers of professional 
networking services — below marginal cost and still maintain its 
dominance by charging fees to some other group, and a provider of 
free services to consumers can attain and maintain dominance by 
controlling access to the “market for eyeballs.” 
Another set of strategies for leveraging economies of scale into more 
durable patterns of competitive advantage involves preferential 
placement, and exploits a conundrum that confronts platform users as 
platform economies of scale become more and more overpowering. 
Platform users — whether buyers and sellers or social network 
members seeking their counterparts — seek access to platforms in 
order to be found. They soon discover, though, that while access to 
platforms is a necessity, access alone is insufficient; competitive or 
reputational success in a platform environment requires information-
based strategies for boosting visibility. In theory, the platform’s 
legibility function should provide effective matching in ways that take 
account of “long tail” patterns of supply and demand; in reality, the 
results of algorithmic matching often seem to prioritize the most 
popular results. Platforms have developed various techniques for 
offering and monetizing preferential placement, such as “sponsored 
search results” (e.g., Google’s AdWords and AdSense programs) and 
“enhanced listing placement” (e.g., Amazon’s Featured Merchant 
program).33 Because of the platform environment’s operational 
 
 31 On the rich-get-richer principle, see BARABASI, supra note 23, at 79-92. 
 32 See generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress 
Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The 
Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 18783, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18783.  
 33 See, e.g., Buy Box Eligible Status, AMAZON, http://smile.amazon.com/gp/help/ 
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secrecy, however, purchasers of these services cannot easily monitor 
the quality of what they have purchased; more generally, platform 
users cannot easily determine whether platform firms are engaging in 
other, undisclosed varieties of preferential placement.34 
A third set of strategies for leveraging economies of scale into more 
durable patterns of competitive advantage involves interplatform 
affiliation. Smaller and more specialized platforms may contract with 
more dominant platforms to provide particular services — e.g., 
payment processing, streaming video, games for social network users, 
and so on. Such arrangements benefit both dominant and niche 
platforms, giving niche platforms access to a larger pool of users and 
dominant platforms access to a larger and deeper pool of information 
about users’ online activities.35 It is unsurprising, then, that the 
interrelationships among platforms have become increasingly dense 
and complex. Such agreements, though, also create risks for all parties. 
A dominant platform must consider the possibility that what had been 
envisioned as a niche or add-on service will become a new species of 
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dominant intermediary in its own right, as Internet browsers, search 
engines, social networks, and mobile operating systems all have done. 
Niche platforms, meanwhile, are no better placed than platform users 
to monitor the behavior of dominant platforms. They may find 
themselves receiving fewer or different benefits than expected or 
competing with the dominant platform’s own offerings under 
conditions that seem to place them at a disadvantage.36 
From the perspective of users, advertisers, and niche platforms, 
dominant platforms like Google and Facebook function in a manner 
analogous to utilities, supplying basic information services now 
deemed essential to a wide variety of economic and social activities. At 
the same time, dominant platforms also constitute vast and highly 
differentiated information ecosystems. The tools for effecting legibility 
constructed by such businesses extend globally, subsuming and 
rematerializing not only markets but also patterns of social and 
political interaction. 
E. How Platforms Shape Information Flow, part 2: Personalization, 
Polarization, and Volatility in the Networked Public Sphere 
Massively intermediated, platform-based media infrastructures have 
reshaped the ways that narratives about reality, value, and reputation 
are crafted, circulated, and contested. Platforms enhance the ability to 
form groups and share information among members, to harness the 
wisdom of crowds, and to coalesce in passionate, powerful mobs, but 
they also magnify the dark side of each of these forms of collective 
action. The massive intermediation and datafication of networked 
media infrastructures, meanwhile, shifts the tenor of much networked 
interaction into the domains of the affective, instinctual, and 
unreasoning. 
The dominant cultural narratives about the cultural and political 
effects of platforms have been celebratory. Just as networked digital 
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platforms have lowered the costs of identifying and connecting with 
commercial counterparties, so they also have lowered the costs of 
forming affinity groups of all kinds. Platform users can more easily 
find and connect with others who share their hobbies and passions, 
their political affiliations and goals, their racial, religious, or gender 
identities, their affiliations with real-world communities (such as 
neighborhood or parent-teacher associations), and many more. 
Networked, platform-based digital media infrastructures also facilitate 
distributed, peer-based production of information.37 As a result, the 
Internet era has witnessed the emergence of a vast, diverse, and 
eclectic range of cultural production, ranging from open source 
software developed according to the maxim “given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow” to wikis and fanworks reflecting multiple 
contributions.38 The landscape of networked collective action also 
encompasses new forms of collective meaning-making, such as memes 
and flash mobs; new infrastructures for facilitating both traditional 
charitable giving and other types of “pay-it-forward” generosity; and 
new capacities for rapid organization of mass protests, such as those of 
the Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter movements and the 
Arab Spring uprisings.39 
Other implications of the contemporary, platform-based digital 
environment’s affordances for group-formation, distributed peer 
production, and collective action are less rosy. Crowd-based 
judgments about relevance can create information cascades that lend 
sensationalized, false, and hatred-inciting online material 
extraordinary staying power.40 Efforts to remove hurtful material 
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typically backfire by drawing additional attention to it, intensifying 
and prolonging the unwanted exposure.41 Additionally, because of the 
way that platform-based, massively-intermediated environments work, 
networked spaces both expose and intensify political and ideological 
polarization around multiple, assertedly equivalent truths. A wealth of 
social science research shows that more homogenous groups can more 
easily become polarized in both their beliefs and their perceptions of 
reality.42 Such polarization is not new, but over the last several 
decades, the percentages of those reporting strongly negative feelings 
about those with opposing views have skyrocketed.43 Algorithmic 
mediation of information flows intended to target controversial 
material to receptive audiences intensifies such feelings, reinforcing 
existing biases, inculcating resistance to facts that contradict preferred 
narratives, and encouraging demonization and abuse.44 New data 
harvesting techniques designed to detect users’ moods and emotions 
and messaging techniques that rely on “clickbait” exacerbate these 
problems; increasingly, today’s networked information flows are 
optimized for subconscious, affective appeal.45 As in-group, 
perspectival “filter bubbles” become more pronounced, crossing 
cultural and ideological lines becomes more difficult. Exposure to 
opposing views is more likely to trigger automatic, instinctual 
rejection and anger than it is to promote reasoned engagement.46 
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Platform-based information feeds also flatten communicative 
hierarchies in a way that challenges traditional heuristics for judging 
credibility and may undermine claims to objective and/or empirical 
authority; within a Facebook or Twitter feed, for example, all sources 
are (or appear to be) epistemologically equivalent.47 
Notably, platform affordances for volatility, polarization, and 
relativization are easily manipulated for malicious or simply self-
interested purposes. As is now widely known, in the months 
preceding the 2016 U.S. presidential election, web sites peddling “fake 
news” stories — such as allegations that Democratic candidate Hillary 
Clinton and her campaign manager, John Podesta, were running a 
child pornography ring out of the basement of a Washington, D.C., 
pizza restaurant — earned their distributors millions of dollars in 
advertising revenues. According to their own statements, at least some 
distributors had no particular political axe to grind, but instead were 
simply exploiting the affordances of the network by circulating 
“clickbait” carefully designed to earn the clicks, views, shares, and 
retweets that generate advertising revenue. Others, we have come to 
learn, were sponsored by state actors with grander hopes and 
ambitions.48 As they had hoped, groups predisposed to believe the 
worst of Clinton and her team shared, up-voted, and retweeted the 
stories.49 Experts in election law and digital voting, watching carefully 
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for signs of fraudulent tampering with digital voting machines, were 
unprepared for a new kind of digital tampering campaign that took 
aim directly at voters’ minds. But perhaps no-one should have been 
surprised; the earlier “Brexit” vote in the United Kingdom had 
followed a similar pattern.50 
With increased volatility and polarization also has come a rise in 
identity-based harassment, mob aggression, nationalism, and 
organized hate. Affordances for collective action have enabled the 
rapid formation of angry, vengeful mobs, eager to shame real or 
apparent transgressors or to engage in identity-based harassment and 
intimidation. Women and members of racial, religious, and/or sexual 
minorities who have become prominent in media and journalism or in 
hacker and gaming communities are especially frequent targets of such 
campaigns.51 More generally, organized hate against racial and 
religious minorities is on the rise, aided by algorithmic processes that 
amplify bigoted diatribes, magnify conspiracy theories, and propel 
coded memes into the limelight.52 Nativist hate-mongering online has 
bled inexorably into political discourse and public life, adopting 
sophisticated and ironic new forms, gaining in strength as outraged 
responses generate new information cascades, and fueling the rise of 
the self-designated “alt-right” as a political force.53 
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The increasingly polarized, volatile, and unreasoning character of 
interaction in online, platform-based digital environments complicates 
accounts of the democratizing potential of information networks. 
Networked, platform-based information and communication 
technologies are crowd-enhancers; they boost the amplitude of 
collective actions and counter-actions, making networked spaces sites of 
both extraordinary generativity and extraordinary volatility. 
Undeniably, such technologies have important affordances for bottom-
up organizing, collective creativity, and crowd-sourced, democratic 
action. Collective meaning-making and collective action, however, can 
be directed toward a variety of ends. The particular configurations that 
those technologies have assumed within the political economy of 
informational capitalism also make them sites of extraordinary 
manipulability, creating new risks to the human project of democratic, 
inclusive, sustainable coexistence. Accounts of the promise or peril of 
networked communication and production have tended to downplay 
one or the other face of networked communication and collective 
action, but — at least for the present — the two are inextricably linked. 
II. PLATFORM ENTITLEMENTS 
As platforms have interacted with the legal system, their efforts have 
begun to reshape the landscape of baseline entitlements (and 
disentitlements) in informational resources. A useful starting point 
from which to begin thinking through the issues is the classic 
taxonomy developed by Wesley Hohfeld over a century ago.54 
Hohfeld’s central insight was that entitlements are relational, and that 
the rights-duties relationship — i.e., the relationship that arises when 
one person has a right that others must respect — is only one of the 
possibilities. Entitlements also may take the form of privileges, 
powers, or immunities, each of which affects others in different kinds 
of ways. If one takes that insight seriously, it follows that law might 
shape the transition to an information economy in multiple ways. It 
might define rights and correlative duties in new informational 
resources, but it might also, for example, recognize privileges to 
appropriate certain new and valuable resources and/or confer legal 
immunity for certain types of informational harm. As we are about to 
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see, it has done all of those things — and has done them in ways that 
systematically facilitate the platform economy’s emergence. 
A. Points of Access (Rights to Control Entry) 
Among intellectual property lawyers, it is a truism that data and 
algorithms — the building blocks of innovation and competition — 
cannot themselves be the subjects of property rights. Appearances can 
be deceptive, however. The movement to an informational economy is 
reconstructing data and algorithms as appropriable inputs to new and 
highly informationalized modes of profit extraction. Data flows from 
the dematerialization of labor, land, and money have been joined by a 
new and highly lucrative fourth factor of production: personal 
information gathered from and about individuals and groups. Property 
formalism notwithstanding, these resources are the subjects of active 
appropriation strategies. As the perceived imperatives of access to data 
and to data processing capacity have sharpened, platform-driven 
cycles of dis- and re- intermediation have emerged as a recurring motif 
in information-economy narratives about competition, innovation, 
and access. 
Platform-based competitive strategies revolve fundamentally around 
control of access in two different and complementary senses. Platform 
users seek access to the essential social, commercial, and cultural 
connectivity that platforms provide, while platform providers seek 
access to the data necessary to create and sustain competitive 
advantage in their chosen field(s) of intermediation. The result is a 
bargain that appears relatively straightforward — access for data — 
but that in reality is complex and importantly generative. One 
important byproduct of these access-for-data arrangements is a quiet 
revolution in the legal status of data as (de facto if not de jure) 
proprietary informational property. 
A principal worry for any platform is disintermediation by a would-
be competitor, and so platform providers work to define both 
collected data and algorithmic logics as zones of exclusivity. In 
particular, platforms use contracts systematically to facilitate and 
protect their own legibility function, extracting transparency from 
users but shielding basic operational knowledge from third-party 
vendors, users, and advertisers alike. The particular form of the access-
for-data contract — a boilerplate terms-of-use agreement not open to 
negotiation — asserts a nonnegotiable authority over the conditions of 
access that operates in the background of even the most generative 
information-economy service. Boilerplate agreements are contractual 
in form but mandatory in operation, and so are a powerful tool both 
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for private ordering of behavior and for private reordering of even the 
most bedrock legal rights and obligations.55 
From an intellectual property perspective, the terms-of-use 
agreements crafted by platforms and other information intermediaries 
function as points of entry for institutional entrepreneurship targeting 
the form and substance of legal entitlements in information. In a 
process that is fundamentally performative, the terms-of-use 
agreement steps in where the map of formal legal entitlements ends, 
providing a vehicle for leveraging trade secrecy entitlements into de 
facto property arrangements that affect large numbers of people with 
no direct relationship with the platform owner. The contracts 
themselves, of course, are “only words” — and, for that matter, words 
that most users do not read — but they gain powerful normative force 
from both their continual assertion and reassertion and their 
propagation within environments that use technical protocols to 
define the parameters of permitted behavior.56 The combination of 
asserted contractual control and technical control becomes the vehicle 
through which the platform imposes its own logics on the encounters 
that it mediates. 
The logic of performative enclosure that infuses terms-of-use 
agreements also carries over into platform enterprises’ dealings with 
developers and commercial counterparties, where it is paired with 
subsidiary strategies of performative openness. Even as they jockey 
with one another to become the intermediary of choice for more and 
more users’ networked interactions, dominant platforms understand 
the risk of disintermediation as a continuing threat. Successful 
platforms jealously guard access to both data collected from users and 
the algorithms used to process the data — and at the time same entice 
developers and commercial counterparties with promises of access. So, 
for example, Facebook’s promise not to share users’ data with 
advertisers is true; it offers advertisers placement precisely targeted to 
the inferred needs and desires of its billions of users but never direct 
access to the data or algorithms themselves. Application developers 
receive access to carefully curated data sets, data structures and 
 
 55 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013). 
 56 Cf. Nicholas Blomley, Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing, ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI., Nov. 2014, at 133 (describing the ways that legal practices and 
distinctions themselves produce the perceived reality within which those distinctions 
matter); Nicholas Blomley, Performing Property: Making the World, 26 CAN. J.L. & 
JURIS. 23, 39-40 (2013). 
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programming interfaces.57 Google’s vaunted commitments to open 
data and open code do not extend to its algorithms or to the data it 
collects about its users, and it imposes other restrictive conditions on 
developers seeking to offer Android devices or Android-compatible 
applications.58 
Traditional intellectual property rights play helpful but only 
secondary roles in the process of de facto propertization, functioning 
as sources of leverage that can be invoked to channel would-be users 
toward entering the access-for-data bargain on the platform’s terms 
and/or to prevent would-be competitors from gaining access to 
information stored on the platform by other means. For example, 
access to a branded exchange may enable third-party vendors to 
position their products and services as more desirable to consumers. 
When access to a platform requires technical interoperability — as is 
the case, for example, with apps for desktop and mobile operating 
systems — patents and copyrights can supply important points of 
leverage against unauthorized access by third-party vendors and 
would-be platform competitors. As the example of Google shows, 
however, not all platform businesses consider copyrights a necessary 
tool for limiting access. 
In sum, the access-for-data arrangement is both a concrete bargain 
and a complex act of institutional entrepreneurship, with a number of 
interrelated implications for the intellectual property system that are 
still playing out. In addition to their other roles, platforms are in an 
important sense intellectual property entrepreneurs, working to refine 
and propagate appropriation strategies that serve their economic 
interests. Yet the investigation in this section also has surfaced 
additional questions: Where do the data that feed platformized logics 
of appropriation come from, and who decides on their allocation? 
What accounts for the startling power of platforms to command 
adherence to their terms? Have any countervailing obligations 
emerged that platforms are bound to respect? Who or what determines 
the proper allocation of accountability for harms flowing from 
datafication and platformization? As we will see in the remainder of 
 
 57 See generally Helmond, supra note 21; Plantin et al., supra note 22, at 11-12.  
 58 See generally Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power through 
Tying and Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 365, 389-91 (2015); Plantin et al., 
supra note 22, at 13-14; Christian Sandvig, Seeing the Sort: The Aesthetic and Industrial 
Defense of “The Algorithm,” MEDIA-N (2014), http://median.newmediacaucus.org/art-
infrastructures-information/seeing-the-sort-the-aesthetic-and-industrial-defense-of-
the-algorithm.  
  
2017] Law for the Platform Economy 157 
this Part, answering those questions requires moving beyond 
investigations of rights and correlative duties to respect them. 
B. Points of Extraction (Privileges to Appropriate) 
As Part I explained, the data extracted from individuals plays an 
increasingly important role as raw material in the political economy of 
informational capitalism. Scholarship on the relationship between law 
and the collection and processing of personal information typically 
considers such activities as raising problems of privacy or data 
protection, and typically has focused on regulation of such activities 
after the fact. But the legal framework within which the collection, 
processing, and use of personal data occur is not simply a reactive 
framework, nor is it simply concerned with the relationship between 
policing (or employment, consumer finance, or medical research) and 
privacy. Understood as processes of resource extraction, the activities 
of collecting and processing personal information mobilize a very 
different legal construct — one foreign to privacy and data protection 
law but commonplace within intellectual property law. Contemporary 
practices of personal information processing constitute a new type of 
public domain: a source of raw materials that are there for the taking 
and that are framed as inputs to particular types of productive 
activity.59 
A public domain is not a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is first 
and foremost an idea: a culturally-situated way of understanding 
patterns of resource ownership and availability. But a public domain 
also is much more than an idea: the construct of a public domain both 
designates particular types of resources as available and suggests 
particular ways of putting them to work.60 In Hohfeldian terms, a 
public domain is a zone of legal privilege: it demarcates conduct as to 
which no-one has a right to object. It thereby legitimates the resulting 
patterns of appropriation and obscures the distributive politics in 
which they are embedded. 
We have already seen that the logic of productive appropriation 
from a public domain of personal data has catalyzed sweeping 
reorganizations of sociotechnical activity to facilitate cultivation, 
 
 59 The discussion in this section is adapted from Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical 
Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy, PHIL. & TECH., Mar. 
28, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0258-2. 
 60 See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public 
Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (2004); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY 
L.J. 965 (1990). 
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harvesting, and appropriation of personal data. Notably, 
participants in the personal data economy — including platform 
providers but also data brokers and digital analytics firms — have 
systematically devised data collection strategies that route around 
the obstacles posed by privacy and data protection frameworks 
devised for an earlier era. In the United States, most privacy 
statutes are sector-specific; many apply only to certain entities and 
most contain exceptions allowing consent to information 
collection and processing. Platforms in particular have structured 
their information-collection activities around broad presumptive 
consent and have configured the world of networked digital 
infrastructures and artifacts in ways that make user enrollment 
seamless and near-automatic. The resulting sociotechnical processes 
work both to generate large quantities of personal information and to 
make public domain status the default condition for the information 
that is generated. 
The logic of productive appropriation from a public domain of 
personal data also does epistemological work. It frames the personal 
information harvested within networked information environments as 
raw, creating the backdrop for new algorithmic techniques of 
knowledge production that operate as sites of legal privilege. Within 
intellectual property circles, that narrative is entirely commonplace. In 
1984, John Moore sued the Regents of the University of California and 
a UCLA doctor who had treated his leukemia for conversion 
(wrongful appropriation) of his personal property. The property 
identified in his complaint was his cancerous spleen, which had been 
removed from his body and used to develop a valuable, patented cell 
line. The lawsuit reached the California Supreme Court, which 
rejected Moore’s conversion theory on the ground that diseased tissue 
removed from the human body could not be the subject of a property 
interest (though it allowed Moore to maintain an action for failure of 
informed consent).61 The Moore opinion is routinely included in first-
year property casebooks, where it stands for the principle that anti-
commodification values can (sometimes) prevent the propertization of 
human tissue. But the court did not hold that human tissue could not 
be the subject of any proprietary claims. Rather, it contrasted Moore’s 
claim to that of the research scientists who had labored to develop the 
patentable byproduct. And, even as it took for granted the wisdom of 
granting patents on medical research byproducts, it worried fretfully 
 
 61 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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about the costs to innovation of allowing proprietary claims to the raw 
materials used in medical research.62 
One can trace a similar elaboration of relative privilege and 
disentitlement in the evolving debate about the future of fair 
information practices in the era of pervasive commercial surveillance. 
In regulatory proceedings and in the media, the data processing 
industries have advanced a carefully crafted narrative that links data 
processing with “innovation” and positions privacy and “innovation” 
as fundamentally and intractably opposed. That narrative powerfully 
shapes prevailing perceptions of feasible regulatory options.63 Data 
brokers and platform firms proudly tout their “unprecedented,” 
“proprietary,” and sometimes “patented” analytic techniques.64 Claims 
like these situate ownership of personal data at the heart of the data 
refinery, vesting it in those who (supposedly) create value where none 
previously existed. They work to create and perpetuate a narrative of 
romantic authorship that unfolds in counterpoint to that of the public 
domain, and that is old and familiar.65 Meanwhile, commentators 
concerned to preserve the benefits of so-called “Big Data” worry that a 
right to withdraw one’s data from databases, if widely exercised, would 
compromise the utility of those databases as resources for pattern 
identification.66 
The “raw data” framing, of course, conceals an important 
misdescription. As we saw in Part I, it is inaccurate to say that the data 
 
 62 See id. at 494-95. 
 63 See Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the 
Participatory Turn, in THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 207, 218-22 
(2016). 
 64 For some examples, see About, INTELIUS, http://corp.intelius.com (last visited July 
20, 2017) (“proprietary genomic technology”); About, SPOKEO, http://www.spokeo.com/ 
about (last visited July 20, 2017) (“proprietary merge technology”); Company Overview, 
ID ANALYTICS, http://www.idanalytics.com/company (last visited July 20, 2017) 
(“patented analytics”); Amit Finkelstein, Facebook Analytics Adds Pages Support and 
Launches Automated Insights, FACEBOOK FOR DEVELOPERS (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2017/04/18/facebook-analytics-new-features-
f8 (“advanced machine learning and artificial intelligence,” “exciting features,” 
“powerful”); New Oracle Data Cloud and Data-as-Service Offerings Redefine Data-Driven 
Enterprise, ORACLE (July 22, 2014), http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/pressrelease/ 
data-cloud-and-daas-072214 (“unprecedented intelligence”); Susan Wojcicki, The Eight 
Pillars of Innovation, THINK WITH GOOGLE (July 2011), https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/ 
marketing-resources/8-pillars-of-innovation (“sophisticated technology,” “innovative 
outcomes,” “uncharted territory”).  
 65 See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1998); Chander & Sunder, supra note 60. 
 66 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time 
for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 67-68 (2012). 
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collected for processing just happen to be there; flows of personal data 
are artifacts of design for datafication. From that perspective, the 
processes of harvesting and culling “raw” consumer personal data 
resemble the harvesting of raw materials within an industrial system of 
agriculture. Just as agriculture on an industrial scale demands grain 
varieties suited to being grown and harvested industrially, so the 
collection of personal information on an industrial scale inevitably 
adopts an active, curatorial stance regarding the items to be gathered.67 
Strains of information are selected and cultivated precisely for their 
durability and commercial value within a set of information processing 
operations. The data are both raw and cultivated, both real and highly 
artificial. The algorithmic processes that manipulate the data function 
as information-age refineries. In a process comparable to the milling of 
corn and wheat to generate stable, uniform byproducts optimized for 
industrial food production, they convert data-based inputs into the 
forms best suited for exploitation on an industrial scale.68 They refine 
and massage consumer personal data to produce virtual 
representations — data doubles — that work to make human 
behaviors and preferences calculable, predictable, and profitable in 
aggregate by producing tranches of data doubles with probabilistically 
determined purchasing and risk profiles.69 Business of all sorts can use 
the information to determine the particular prices and feature 
packages best calibrated for surplus extraction, and to generate 
preemptive nudges that, when well executed, operate as self-fulfilling 
prophecies, producing consummated transactions over the offerings 
already judged to be most likely to appeal to targeted consumers.70 
 
 67 See MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR 
MEALS 30-31, 36-37, 41-42, 45, 58-59 (2007). See generally Danah Boyd & Kate 
Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, 
and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662 (2012); LISA GITELMAN, ED., 
“RAW DATA” IS AN OXYMORON (2013). 
 68 See POLLAN, supra note 67, at 17-19, 85-99. 
 69 See generally Greg Elmer, IPO 2.0: The Panopticon Goes Public, 4 MEDIA TROPES 
1, 9-12 (2013); Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Seeing Like a Market, 15 SOCIO-
ECON. REV. 9 (2017); Zuboff, supra note 29. 
 70 This terminology combines the concept of the nudge, imported from the 
context of behavioral economics, see generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008), and is 
now widely used by both critics and admirers of data-based analytics, with that of 
preemption as used by MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF 
LAW 57-61 (2015), and Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: 
How Big Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 68-71 (2013). 
The preemptive nudge simultaneously suggests and forecloses. 
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The idea of a public domain of personal information does vital 
background work in the emerging platform economy, altering the 
legal status of the inputs to and outputs of personal data processing in 
ways that are relational and distributive. It both suggests and 
legitimates a pattern of appropriation by some, with economic and 
political consequences for others. 
C. Speech Markets and Information Laboratories (Immunities from 
Accountability) 
As the networked information environment has redistributed 
control over reputational development, powerful economic actors 
have worked to craft narratives that make unaccountability for certain 
types of information harms seem logical, inevitable, and right. They 
have relied heavily on the U.S. first amendment tradition, which 
characterizes the public sphere as a marketplace of ideas — an arena 
for neutral truth production through deliberate, reasoned exchange, 
where the goods on offer can be evaluated on their merits, where the 
volume and quality of information are regulated by the laws of supply 
and demand, and where those making decisions about the quality of 
information function as separate, individual nodes of rationality.71 In 
that project, they have benefited from preexisting libertarian and 
neoliberal narratives that already supplied potent recipes for resisting 
media regulation. As the marketplace metaphor has come to be seen as 
increasingly inapt for the massively-intermediated, platform-based 
information environment, however, platforms also have introduced a 
new metaphoric frame: that of the information laboratory, which 
functions as a site of depoliticized innovation through continuous, 
behaviorist experimentation. In Hohfeldian terms, the developments 
sketched in this section are most aptly characterized as emergent legal 
immunities and correlative disabilities. Their ongoing construction has 
proceeded in almost willful disregard of the fact that the affordances of 
 
 71 The metaphor traces its origins to a famous dissent by Justice Holmes. See 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that 
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market . . . .”). For a sampling of perspectives on the metaphor and its significance for 
free speech jurisprudence, see generally Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing 
Myth, 33 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353 (2000). 
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the platform-based, massively intermediated information environment 
strain the idea of neutral truth production past the breaking point. 
The legal construction of platform immunity for information harms 
is in part a constitutional strategy that leverages preexisting trends in 
first amendment jurisprudence. For some time now, a campaign has 
been underway to insulate all forms of commercial information 
processing and direct-to-consumer communication from regulatory 
oversight on first amendment grounds. For almost two centuries, the 
first amendment was considered largely irrelevant to regulation of 
speech advancing commercial activities because such regulation was 
understood to be directed fundamentally at commerce rather than at 
public discourse. That began to change in the late twentieth-century, 
in a line of cases that became known as the Court’s commercial speech 
jurisprudence; according to those cases, regulation of commercial 
speech that is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity must 
advance a substantial government interest and must be appropriately 
tailored to that interest.72 Today that doctrine is under sustained 
assault for being too lenient. Both regulations addressing direct-to-
consumer communication and regulations addressing information 
processing more generally begin with some definition of scope that 
identifies particular types of content and/or particular actors. Other 
strands of first amendment jurisprudence label such distinctions as 
requiring compelling justification and the narrowest possible tailoring. 
That analytical gap has created a point of entry for an antiregulatory 
agenda that holds all regulation of information processing to be 
illegitimate.73 A notable recent victory for that agenda is Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., in which a majority of the Court struck down a Vermont 
statute prohibiting pharmaceutical companies’ use of prescriber-
identifying information for marketing purposes, applying strict 
 
 72 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-
66 (1980). See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 73 For a discussion of the origins of the neoliberal first amendment as an advocacy 
movement, see generally Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 133. 
For influential formulations of the first amendment challenge to information privacy 
regulation, see generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: 
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Keep Other People from Speaking About You, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000); Solveig Singleton, Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical View of 
Proposals to Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Jan. 22, 
1998, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-295.pdf (Policy Analysis 
No. 295); Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls & 
Privacy Regulation?, PROGRESS ON POINT, Nov. 2009, at 1, http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/2009/pop16.19-unites-speech-and-privacy-reg-advocates.pdf. 
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scrutiny because the restriction was both content- and speaker-
based.74 Characterizing the state’s action as an attempt to undermine 
the persuasive force of pharmaceutical marketers’ speech (and thereby 
harnessing the marketplace metaphor), the majority concluded that 
the law struck at the core of the zone that the first amendment 
protects.75 
Although platforms did not originate the campaign to 
constitutionalize regulation of commercial information processing 
activities, they have been willing participants both through their own 
efforts and via the efforts of trade associations and libertarian think 
tanks. Advertiser trade associations that count major platform firms 
Apple, Google, and Microsoft among their members filed a coalition 
amicus brief on behalf of respondent data brokers in Sorrell and 
regularly participate in other commercial speech litigation.76 In 2012, 
Google commissioned an expert white paper on platform free speech 
rights that has become a cornerstone of the speech-based defense that 
platforms assert in litigation with private plaintiffs challenging their 
information processing practices.77 
In litigation with private parties alleging information-related harms, 
however, courts typically do not need to reach constitutional defenses 
because another kind of immunity kicks in. Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), enacted as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, grants broad immunity to online 
intermediaries for their roles in distributing speech produced by 
others.78 In the legislative history and in individual statements, 
 
 74 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563-70 (2011). See generally Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that laws either motivated by 
disagreement with a message or unable to be justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech are content-based and must satisfy strict scrutiny). 
 75 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 577-78. 
 76 Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. et al. in Support of 
Respondents, Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552 (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 1253920. But see, e.g., 
Brief of Amici Curiae of Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners, 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835112. 
 77 See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for 
Search Engine Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883 (2012); see also e-ventures Worldwide, 
LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (“The Court has 
little quarrel with the cases cited by Google for the proposition that search engine 
output results are protected by the First Amendment.”) (citing Zhang v. Baidu.com 
Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)), appeal docketed, No. 17-11178 (11th 
Cir. Mar. 16, 2017); Defendants Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC; Backpage.com, 
LLC; and New Times Media, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, 17-26, J.S. v. 
Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, No. 12-2-11362-4 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 78 Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 138 
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members of Congress endorsed the marketplace metaphor as the 
principal justification for section 230’s broad grant of immunity, 
stating their belief that such immunity would foster and preserve the 
emerging network as a vibrant marketplace of ideas.79 Both the 
statutory language and the discourse that surrounded its adoption 
framed still-emergent networked information architectures as engines 
for neutral truth production — conduits that would simply reflect and 
transmit what people wanted to say. In other words, they posited the 
Internet as a space lacking the sorts of specific affordances that might 
themselves shape communicative practices and communicative 
content.80 
Speech intermediaries and information aggregators have worked 
strenuously to defend that institutional settlement even as time and 
technological change have undermined its implicit premises, 
downplaying or reframing the extent to which what we see online is 
itself recursively shaped by what information businesses produce. For 
the most part, courts have uncritically accepted those arguments, 
concluding both that algorithmic mediation doesn’t make an 
intermediary a publisher of other people’s speech and that the same 
processes of mediation are speech-like in their own right.81 
As Part I explained, however, market-based narratives about the 
origins of and justifications for platform immunity are premised on 
 
(1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012)). 
 79 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (1998)) (“The Internet and other 
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need for competition among information media so that the free marketplace of ideas 
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and minimize prices.”); see also Senator Ronald Wyden, Speech to the Section 230 
Anniversary Conference (Mar. 4, 2011) (“The Internet is becoming a central platform 
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lane of the 21st century, the marketplace of ideas and a democratic town square inside 
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 80 See Gillespie, supra note 27, at 359. On the persistence and inaccuracy of the 
myth of cyberspace as empty space, see generally Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace and/as 
Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007) [hereinafter Cohen, Cyberspace]. 
 81 See generally James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 
(2014). 
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assumptions about the affordances of media infrastructures that no 
longer hold. Platform-based, massively-intermediated processes of 
search and social networking are inherently processes of market 
manipulation. Networked environments configured to optimize data 
harvesting and surplus extraction operate — and are systematically 
designed to operate — in ways that preclude even the most perceptive 
and reasonable consumer from evaluating the goods or services on 
offer. Predictive profiling seeks to minimize the need to persuade by 
targeting directly those potential customers most strongly predisposed 
to buy and appealing to everything that is known about those 
customers’ habits and predilections. And, as we saw in Part I, the 
deliberate design of platform-based, massively-intermediated media 
infrastructures for data harvesting and commercial surveillance has 
produced other, less deliberate affordances that amplify the role of 
unreason in online interaction, and that matter enormously. 
Most recently, platform businesses have begun to acknowledge more 
directly their pervasive manipulations of the information environment 
in the service of profit extraction, and to recast those manipulations as 
inherently directed toward discovering scientific truths about human 
behavior. Platform-based media infrastructures, they argue, are 
information laboratories, in which providers of information services 
experiment to see which types of information are most useful and 
most responsive to consumers’ needs and innovate by providing that 
information. So, for example, Google’s chief economist has explained 
that at any given time Google and competing search engines are 
running millions of experiments on their users, designed to determine 
how we respond to information so that search results can be 
optimized.82 Facebook, which through its news feed competes with 
search engines to structure users’ access to the wider information 
environment, also experiments on its users. In 2014, a paper 
coauthored by a Facebook data scientist and published in the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences described a massive 
experiment in which Facebook varied items in users’ newsfeeds and 
then used automated discourse analysis tools on those users’ own 
subsequent posts to gauge the effects of the newsfeeds on their 
emotional states.83 When critics decried Facebook’s failure to give 
 
 82 See generally Hal R. Varian, Beyond Big Data, 49 BUS. ECON. 27 (2014). 
 83 See Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental 
Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8788 (2014).  
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users prior notice of the experiment, Facebook’s defenders pointed out 
that marketing is inherently a science of experimentation.84 
Within the emerging narrative of the information laboratory as an 
engine of behaviorist truth-discovery and depoliticized innovation, the 
fact that online information intermediaries manipulate meaning in ways 
and for purposes that they do not disclose ceases to be an inconvenient 
truth to be carefully downplayed and becomes banal and unremarkable 
reality. From that perspective, the recent troubling demonstrations that 
platform-based, massively-intermediated media infrastructures have 
played pivotal roles in fostering deeply entrenched political polarization 
— polarization that extends all the way down to bedrock narratives 
about reality and scientific fact — are mere glitches in systems that are 
still being perfected through sober and responsible experimentation. So 
framed, they are not problems requiring resolution in the domain of 
media regulation, competition regulation, or some other domain, but 
rather matters best left to the benevolent and disinterested experts in 
the white lab coats to sort out.85 
That too is a mistake on the most basic, descriptive level. 
Affordances for polarization and volatility are not fixed and invariant; 
they are constructed and can be amplified or dampened by deliberate 
choices made in the course of a platform’s design. At minimum, the 
platform business model, which is so heavily reliant on predictive 
profiling and target marketing and on the information cascades and 
sensationalism that draw eyeballs and generate ad revenues, is causally 
implicated in the current dysfunctions of the online information 
environment even though that was not its creators’ intent. Arguably, 
platform businesses that resist serious, open exploration of those 
causal dynamics are complicit in fostering the dysfunctions. More 
 
 84 For critiques, see, for example, Michael Hiltzik, Facebook’s User Manipulation Study: 
Why You Should Be Very Afraid, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2014, 2:02 PM), http:// 
www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-facebooks-user-20140630-column.html; Letter 
from James Grimmelmann & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Professors of Law, Francis King Carey 
Sch. of Law, to Inder M. Verma, Editor-in-Chief, Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. (July 
17, 2014), http://james.grimmelmann.net/files/legal/facebook/PNAS.pdf. For defenses, see, 
for example, Dan Diamond, The Outrage over Facebook’s ‘Creepy’ Experiment Is out-of-
Bounds — and This Study Proves It, FORBES (July 1, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2014/07/01/the-outrage-over-facebooks-creepy-experiment-
is-out-of-bounds-and-this-study-proves-it; Duncan J. Watts, Stop Complaining About the 
Facebook Study. It’s a Golden Age for Research, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2014, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/facebook-study-science-
experiment-research. 
 85 For an especially fulsome statement of this view, see Mark Zuckerberg, Building 
Global Community, FACEBOOK (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-
zuckerberg/building-global-community/10154544292806634. 
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troubling still, some platforms have been silent partners in fostering 
the hate and harassment that they officially disclaim.86 If ever the time 
were ripe for rethinking the frames and presumptions that 
conventionally have structured discussions of media regulation in U.S. 
law and policy, that time surely is now. 
The logic of expressive immunity, however, requires that attempts to 
focus judicial and legislative attention on these issues be met with 
carefully tended hysteria about censorship and injured protestations of 
first amendment virtue. Those strategies too build upon traditions 
within first amendment doctrine and rhetoric. Both the arguments for 
first amendment immunity and the strident defenses of intermediary 
immunity by information businesses and their apologists express a 
long-established and distinctively neoliberal ideology of public 
discourse, within which profit-motivated private enterprises are 
appropriate and morally virtuous guarantors of expressive liberty.87 
From one perspective, they represent the latest step in a decades-long 
campaign to equate all forms of media regulation with censorship; 
from another, they have produced a new and powerful antiregulatory 
force field that insulates information businesses from accountability 
for both new and old information harms. An analytical framework that 
begins by assuming the problem of mediated unreason away disables 
courts and policymakers from crafting appropriate (and appropriately 
speech-regarding) forms of regulatory oversight. 
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Greedy?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:40 PM), http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/09/ 
google-facebook-and-twitter-sell-hate-speech-targeted-ads.html; Keegan Hankes, Cloudflare 
Optimizing Content Delivery for at Least 48 Hate Sites Across Europe, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. 
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policies, but the changes are controversial and contested. See Timothy B. Lee, Tech 
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(Aug. 31, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/08/tech-companies-
are-cracking-down-on-hate-speech/. 
 87 See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1119 (2015) [hereinafter Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment]; Timothy K. 
Kuhner, Citizens United as Neoliberal Jurisprudence: The Resurgence of Economic 
Theory, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 395 (2011). 
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D. Conduits vs. Content (Powers of Interdiction) 
Platforms are not the only powerful entities with interests in 
shaping flows of information, and logics of intermediation are not the 
only kinds of logics that networked, platform-based infrastructures 
enable. Networked media infrastructures also offer new possibilities 
for interrupting and blocking information flows, and those capabilities 
can be deployed to serve a variety of interests. In particular, nation 
states and intellectual property owners have pushed both to code 
interdiction capabilities into the network’s underlying logical and 
hardware layers and to impose interdiction obligations on network 
intermediaries, including platforms. In Hohfeldian terms, such 
arrangements are most aptly classified as powers to alter the legal 
obligations of others and to impose liability for noncompliance. 
Platforms, meanwhile, have resisted those efforts, seeking 
arrangements that better serve their own interests. In terms of law on 
the books, those struggles have produced a still-shifting patchwork of 
regulatory obligations and political stalemates. The apparent disarray, 
however, masks two more durable shifts. In many contexts, platform-
based and algorithmically-mediated “self-regulation” has emerged as 
the path of least resistance. At the same time, logics of fiat interdiction 
have become progressively normalized within legal and policy 
discourse. 
State actors have always sought to control information flows, and all 
states permit some such controls. For example, in democratic 
countries that traditionally have recognized broad protection for 
freedoms of speech and association, there is broad consensus that 
neither child pornography nor step-by-step instructions for producing 
weapons-grade plutonium should circulate freely. In mid-1990s, 
however, amid dawning realization that decentralized digital networks 
facilitated the uncontrolled and sometimes viral spread of all kinds of 
information, long-stable areas of consensus about state control of 
information flows began to destabilize and shift. Some countries began 
to mandate backbone-level filtering for certain kinds of content and/or 
to enlist Internet access and search providers in such filtering.88 
Others began to confront new kinds of disputes about prohibited 
information flow. 
In the United States, one recurring topic of dispute has been the 
extent of the government’s ability to conduct secret surveillance 
 
 88 See generally MACKINNON, supra note 39, at 34-66; A. Michael Froomkin, The 
Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129 (Brian Kahin 
& Charles Nesson eds., 1997). 
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programs that rely on the cooperation of private communications 
providers and use practices of “deep secrecy” to shield such programs 
from public oversight.89 By the turn of the twenty-first century, a 
diverse collection of scholars, tech industry observers, and legal 
advocates had become worried that networked digital communications 
infrastructures were enabling vast, secret expansions in government 
surveillance activities. Bits of evidence gleaned from public 
investigations following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, inadvertent leaks, 
and isolated acts of whistleblowing were beginning to add up to the 
outline of something much larger. The courts, however, rebuffed an 
early attempt to litigate the chilling effects of dragnet surveillance, 
reasoning that the plaintiffs had not alleged cognizable injury because 
they could not prove they or their clients had been targeted or that any 
of their communications had been collected and read.90 After 
disclosure of a long-term, secret, government surveillance operation 
inside AT&T’s San Francisco Bay Area operations center prompted 
class action litigation, Congress hastily amended the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to retroactively authorize certain 
warrantless demands for interception and also granted retroactive 
immunity to intermediaries that had complied with such demands.91 
Then, in June 2013, the world learned that former National Security 
Agency contractor Edward Snowden had copied and disclosed to the 
media voluminous files documenting the NSA’s extralegal surveillance 
of communications worldwide, including many programs conducted 
with the essential involvement of platform firms. In the wave of 
lawsuits that followed the Snowden disclosures, courts have become 
willing to concede that the government conducted some level of 
dragnet communications surveillance but then have cited other 
justifications either for dismissal or for allowing only limited 
“jurisdictional discovery” that feature logics of fiat interdiction at their 
core, including both the need to defer to the executive branch in 
national security matters and the imperative of protecting state 
secrets.92 
 
 89 See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010). 
 90 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1140-41 (2013).  
 91 See FISA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, 2448-67 
(2008) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a, 1885a(a)(4) (2015)); In re Nat’l 
Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(dismissing class action claims), aff’d in relevant part, 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 958 (2012). 
 92 See, e.g., Wikimedia Found. v. NSA, 857 F.3d 193, 209-11, 213-15 (4th Cir. 
2017) (recognizing standing for large media organization engaged in trillions of 
communications but holding that other plaintiffs lacked standing because they could 
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Another recurring topic of dispute has been the extent to which the 
government can require platforms to preserve lines of access into 
users’ private communications. In 1994, Congress enacted legislation 
requiring telecommunications providers to design and maintain 
wiretap capability, but efforts to legislate similar “back door” 
capabilities for digital microprocessors were defeated after strong 
opposition from both the computer industry and academic computer 
scientists.93 The resulting equilibrium was only temporary, however. 
The statutory framework has become increasingly obsolete in an era in 
which communications by voice, text, and email all travel over digital 
networks and in which capabilities for strong communications 
encryption are increasingly widespread. In the wake of the 2015 
terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, after which investigators 
acquired but could not readily access one terrorist’s iPhone, law 
enforcement and national security officials mounted an aggressive 
campaign, still continuing as of this writing, to convince both 
Congress and the courts to impose decryption mandates on 
communications firms that provide strong encryption capabilities to 
their users.94 
 
not show that NSA’s upstream surveillance program intercepted “substantially all” 
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The major copyright industries and software producing firms also 
have worked to alter the legal status of providers of networked 
information services in ways that would require them to prevent flows 
of unauthorized content or face potentially ruinous liability. The 
political power of the copyright industries predates that of platform 
firms. Over the course of the twentieth century, the publishing, music, 
television, and motion picture industries coalesced into a politically 
savvy interest group that exerted powerful influence over the shape of 
copyright legislation. By the 1990s, the software industry also had 
emerged as a force to be reckoned with in copyright legislative 
debates. As the uncontrolled viral spread of information via digital 
networks began to command the attention of lawmakers and 
policymakers, both old and new copyright industries worked to spread 
alarm about the growing amount of online infringement and file-
sharing. In a blizzard of press releases and media interviews, and in a 
variety of more formal interventions ranging from conference remarks 
to congressional testimony, they equated online copyright 
infringement with theft, piracy, communism, plague, pandemic, and, 
notably, with terrorism.95 They lobbied strenuously for the enactment 
of new legislative protections and also filed high-profile lawsuits 
against third-party service and equipment providers that they viewed 
as culpable facilitators. 
Generally speaking, the copyright industries have pursued two 
primary strategies that implicate the legal status of platform firms. One 
revolves around takedowns of infringing content using a streamlined 
process triggered by notice without prior judicial review; formally, the 
process is optional, but platforms that implement it receive safe harbor 
from infringement liability.96 Although the notice-and-takedown 
system regularly elicits significant numbers of meritless or legally 
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questionable takedown notices (many generated by automated 
processes for detecting infringement), it has been implemented around 
the world as a result of pressure exerted by U.S. trade negotiators.97 
The second strategy relies on prohibitions against circumvention of 
technical access protections and trafficking in circumvention 
technologies.98 The anti-trafficking provisions in particular were the 
cornerstone of a litigation campaign designed to ensure that 
manufacturers of equipment for rendering media content sought 
appropriate licenses. As a result of those efforts and parallel campaigns 
to develop new technical-protection formats and standards, the major 
commercially available systems for delivering and playing audiovisual 
content now incorporate functionality designed to defeat copying and 
prevent retransmissions to unauthorized platforms and devices.99 
The emergence of dominant platform firms, however, has shifted the 
balances of power in debates about both government surveillance and 
online copyright enforcement. Platform and copyright interests have 
clashed repeatedly both in the courts and in Congress, and platform 
interests often have gotten the upper hand. From the beginning, new 
platform-based technologies for storing, finding, and sharing 
information seemed to frustrate efforts to block unauthorized flows of 
infringing content. In litigation, the copyright industries argued that 
the platform business model fell outside the scope of legislated safe 
harbors for online service providers that complied with the notice and 
takedown process; in Congress, they pressed their case for the 
imposition of affirmative filtering obligations and other new 
mandates.100 Both efforts failed repeatedly. The push for new mandates 
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culminated in 2011, when proposed legislation establishing new 
procedures for blocking access to domains offering infringing content 
and isolating them from their payment providers began to move 
rapidly through Congress and was widely expected to pass. Instead, 
platform firms flexed their newfound political muscle in a novel way, 
repurposing their access protocols to coordinate a massive 
mobilization of the online community that effectively shut down many 
of the Internet’s most popular sites.101 Congress tabled the legislation 
soon afterward and has not revived it. 
Platform firms also have visibly resisted some government initiatives 
for surveillance and deep secrecy. In 2008, after several widely-
publicized capitulations by platform firms to authoritarian regimes’ 
demands for censorship of certain content, a coalition of platform 
firms, academics, and nongovernmental organizations formed the 
Global Network Initiative, an organization dedicated to helping 
communications intermediaries advocate for their users’ freedom of 
speech, privacy, and other civil liberties worldwide.102 After the 
Snowden revelations, platform giant Apple Computer spearheaded a 
movement to make strong encryption the marketplace default for both 
voice and text communications.103 As law enforcement officials 
seeking access to encrypted communications and devices have urged 
Congress to respond by imposing decryption mandates, platform firms 
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have pushed back, arguing that mandatory decryption “back doors” 
will make the network less secure for everyone.104 Platforms also have 
fought for the ability to make public certain basic kinds of information 
about the many requests that they receive to provide communications 
data for national security investigations.105 
At the same time, though, platforms also have engaged in increasing 
amounts of filtering and interdiction, both for their own purposes and 
as a strategy for defusing public controversy and forestalling direct 
regulation. Every major Internet company that hosts user-provided 
content uses automated filtering technology to prevent the posting of 
infringing content, and the major payment providers have begun 
entering agreements with the major copyright trade associations that 
obligate them to restrict access by entities and sites identified as 
infringing.106 Similarly, following its successful campaign against 
legislated domain-blocking requirements, Google announced that it 
would begin demoting or removing entirely from search results sites 
that generate repeated takedown notices.107 Dominant platform firms 
also filter and remove a wide variety of other content, including some 
terrorist-related content, and are always-already poised to expand 
those initiatives as external events seem to require.108 Notably, 
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although the major platforms widely publicize information about the 
takedown notices they receive from copyright owners and, to the 
extent permitted, about government production requests, they provide 
no comparable public transparency about the details of their own 
automatic filtering and manipulation. 
Commentators attempting to evaluate the complex landscape of 
platform behavior have disagreed about whether to count platforms as 
civil libertarians, obstructors of justice, or privatized extensions of the 
surveillance state.109 I will return to the puzzle of how to connect 
platform behavior with platform motivation in Part III.D, below; here, 
my point is more basic and concerns the division of authority to 
intercept and block information flows. Although the balance of power 
remains contested and is still evolving, two points seem certain: First, 
failures on the part of copyright interests and law enforcement to 
achieve their goals via legislation or litigation most often simply shift 
struggles over interdiction and control into less visible channels. 
Second, compromises that involve voluntary filtering shift much day-
to-day authority over interdiction of information flows to platforms 
and at the same time make interdiction decisions more difficult to 
contest. The “new normal” in the platform economy is a condition in 
which privatized, fiat-based prohibitions on information flow are both 
increasingly routine and increasingly opaque. 
III. PLATFORMS AND REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS 
Many lawyers are familiar with recent high-profile debates over the 
applicability of existing regulatory obligations to platform companies 
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tech-policy/2017/09/facebook-revamps-political-ad-rules-after-discovering-russian-ad-buys; 
Sam Levin, Tech Giants Team Up to Fight Extremism Following Cries that They Allow 
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Moderators on Terrorist Content, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www. 
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content. See generally Tarleton Gillespie, Governance of and by Platforms, in SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA (Jean Burgess et al. eds., forthcoming 2017). 
 109 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech and Compelled Conformity, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (privatized extensions); Kate Klonick, The 
New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (civil libertarians); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance 
Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (obstructors). See generally ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? PROTECTING YOUR DATA FROM GOVERNMENT 
REQUEST: SHARING ECONOMY EDITION 3-4 (2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/05/04/ 
who-has-your-back-2016.pdf. 
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— for example, whether Uber is a taxi company, whether and how 
Amazon.com transactions should be taxed, whether Google or 
Facebook should be required to remove privacy-invasive or harassing 
material that is brought to its attention, and so on. Orly Lobel’s 
important work on the regulation of platforms has parsed many of the 
complexities of these disputes, arguing that the answers to questions 
about both classification and institutional competence depend 
importantly on context.110 
Those debates are important, but participants in them tend to take 
preexisting institutional features of the legal system for granted, and 
my project here is different. Platform companies are encountering 
legal systems worldwide at a time of crisis. Court systems are 
overburdened, regulatory bureaucracies seem to be forever racing to 
respond to fast-moving technological and business developments, and 
new institutions for resolving trade disputes and setting network 
standards route nimbly around other features of the legal landscape — 
ranging from conflicting national laws to international human rights 
mandates and goals — as though they were mere speed bumps. 
Platform companies did not create any of these situations, but they 
have proved adept at exploiting them. Their interventions matter 
precisely because the contours of our regulatory institutions — 
including not only agencies but also courts and institutional structures 
for recognizing and vindicating fundamental rights — are not timeless 
and unchanging. 
Powerful economic interests have always sought to reshape 
jurisdictional, procedural, and methodological rules to their 
advantage. Legal scholars who study judicial and regulatory processes 
have shown that institutional design responds over time to the 
interventions of powerful actors who, in Marc Galanter’s framing, are 
repeat players and can play for rules in addition to results.111 Well-
resourced repeat players also work to craft compelling narratives about 
the structure of legal institutions, pursuing a species of “deep” capture 
that operates at the level of ideology.112 Both projects become easier 
when the ground is shifting. In their encounters with judicial and 
 
 110 See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 117-66 (2016). 
 111 See generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND 
HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014); Marc Galanter, Why 
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 95 (1974). 
 112 See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the 
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 129 (2003). 
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regulatory institutions in the United States and around the world, 
platform firms and their advocates have labored to minimize their 
accountability and maximize their scope for self-determination and 
self-governance. Their interventions have both accelerated and altered 
the trajectories of institutional evolution. 
Processes of institutional realignment also respond to preexisting 
settlements regarding the distribution of rights, privileges, and other 
entitlements. As Morton Horwitz demonstrated in his classic study of 
the evolution of private and commercial law prior to the constitutional 
battles of the Lochner era, such distributive baselines produce deep 
structuring effects, shaping the framing of disputes about a variety of 
other matters.113 So too with informational entitlements and 
disentitlements. In contests over the legal obligations of platforms, the 
logics of performative enclosure, appropriative privilege, expressive 
immunity, and fiat interdiction generate powerful normative force 
fields, defining some options as the paths of least resistance and 
foreclosing others entirely. 
A. Catch Me If You Can: Platforms in Court 
Platforms have developed a suite of powerful strategies for evading 
accountability in litigation.114 To some extent, they have benefited 
from processes of retrenchment that were already underway. Never an 
ideal vehicle for advancement of mass justice claims, the court system 
today is overtaxed logistically and under siege ideologically. As 
consumer products and services and related theories of personal and 
economic harm have become more complex, numbers of lawsuits and 
litigants have mushroomed. At the same time, a well-funded 
movement for “tort reform” has contested attempts to shift liability for 
complex, highly informationalized harms to the industries whose 
products and activities are implicated in those harms.115 Against a 
backdrop of growing institutional dysfunction, platforms have 
leveraged the logics of performative enclosure, appropriative privilege, 
 
 113 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 
47-54, 78-97, 116-26, 186-210, 218-26 (1977). 
 114 The discussion in this section is adapted from Julie E. Cohen, Information 
Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535 (2017) 
[hereinafter Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation].  
 115 For some different perspectives on what to do about the resulting dysfunctions, 
see generally GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS INVENTED 
LAW AND HOW TO REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY (2016); Richard A. 
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Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 421-22 (1982). 
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and expressive immunity to keep many disputes out of the court 
system entirely, to ensure that others are soon dismissed, and to 
minimize the operational impact of the few that proceed to judgment. 
Many lawsuits against platform firms allege information privacy 
harms. Such lawsuits are part of a more general trend in the 
contemporary litigation landscape. New class complaints alleging 
information privacy and data security violations are filed seemingly 
every few weeks and have become enormously controversial. Large 
information businesses and defense counsel bemoan the purported 
threats to corporate bottom lines and to processes of information-
based “innovation” more generally.116 
At least in the case of lawsuits against platform firms, however, 
those worries are largely unfounded. A constellation of rules covering 
everything from waiver of judicial process to standing to the proper 
approaches to structuring class claims and remedies works 
systematically to blunt their impact. Those results flow partly from 
more general changes in the class action litigation landscape. Like 
contemporary mass tort claims, most information privacy claims 
against large information businesses are funneled into procedurally 
opaque multidistrict litigation proceedings, and most suits settle while 
still in the preliminary stages, so that even a certification decision is 
made in the context of a motion to certify a settlement class.117 
Platforms, however, have begun to seem uniquely untouchable. 
 
 116 See, e.g., Brief of the Coal. for Sensible Pub. Records Access et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1-2, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) 
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INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Jan. 7, 2013, at 1-2, 16, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ 
pubs/pdf/pa716.pdf. 
 117 See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573, 584 (N.D. Cal. 
2015); In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-cv-04809 EJD, 2014 WL 
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To begin with, platform firms enjoy an especially privileged position 
from which to exploit the relational turn in litigation avoidance. In a 
wide variety of contexts ranging from employment contracts to service 
contracts to one-off consumer transactions, courts have become more 
and more willing to require enforcement of boilerplate clauses 
requiring arbitration of disputes and waiver of the right to bring class 
claims — and, as a result of that stance, the use of such clauses is 
becoming increasingly widespread.118 Platform firms have taken full 
advantage of this trend, incorporating litigation avoidance provisions 
into their terms of service and thus — via the logic of performative 
enclosure — into the core of the access-for-data bargain.119 As 
platforms intermediate users’ networked lives more and more 
completely, such provisions have become both unavoidable and far-
reaching. 
A second avenue for disposing of information privacy litigation 
against platform firms involves standing to sue. Plaintiffs asserting 
intangible harms often have difficulty establishing the requisite 
injury.120 The logic of appropriative privilege gives platforms a leg up 
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Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs., 
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(2015). 
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in disputes about injuries allegedly flowing from their collection and 
use of personal information. Within the Hohfeldian framework, the 
correlative of an entitlement that takes the form of a privilege is no 
right to object to the conduct that the privilege protects. Defendants in 
information privacy litigation understand that relationship well and 
have labored tirelessly to convince courts of its inevitability, framing 
acts of information collection and use as routine background 
conditions that create no cognizable injury.121 Information privacy 
claims, they argue, are really no more than generalized claims about 
the perceived unfairness of economic and technological processes that 
people have not yet learned to accept. The argument reliably gets 
results; many information privacy claims are dismissed quickly on 
standing grounds and the Supreme Court has signaled its implicit 
support for that approach.122 
Other lawsuits against platform firms allege harms suffered as a 
result of information initially furnished by third parties but made 
more salient through the involvement of platform-based 
intermediation. In these suits, platforms benefit from the logic of 
expressive immunity described in Part II.C above. In contexts 
involving alleged defamation and similar harms, courts have 
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interpreted the statutory immunity for online intermediaries broadly, 
eliminating not only traditional publisher liability but also distributor 
liability for intermediaries possessing knowledge of ongoing harm.123 
In addition, because the statutory language sweeps well beyond 
defamation in ways that implicate many other types of expressive 
conduct, it has supplied defenses in many — though not all — 
lawsuits alleging a wide variety of other harms ranging from 
discrimination to market manipulation.124 Although some 
commentators have questioned whether Congress really intended to 
grant such broad insulation to a business model whose shape was still 
unknown, others have criticized the current regime because it does 
not yield dismissals quickly enough.125 
Of the handful of lawsuits that survive these initial obstacles — 
often claims for violation of sector-specific privacy statutes that 
prescribe particular procedures and provide statutory damages for 
noncompliance — many confront additional hurdles flowing from the 
opaque, technically arcane character of platform-based intermediation 
and from the logic of performative enclosure, which operates to 
shelter the technical details from discovery. Interactions involving 
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consumers’ personally identifying information often are embedded 
deeply within the operating protocols of a mobile phone platforms or 
web browser, and may involve complex commercial relationships 
among multiple players in platforms’ cross-licensing ecologies. That 
complexity and opacity enable platform firms to argue that the 
methods proposed for ascertaining classes of affected consumers are 
too imprecise.126 Courts reject some of these ascertainability 
challenges, but they also routinely decline requests to certify classes 
consisting of all consumers affected by the challenged activity.127 They 
also have been reluctant to craft discovery orders broad enough to 
enable plaintiffs’ counsel to understand the challenged patterns of 
information flow.128 
Even the rare lawsuits against platform firms that yield seven-figure 
class payouts have relatively little effect on platform information 
processing practices. Consider two examples: In 2010, Facebook 
agreed to pay $9.5 million to settle class claims resulting from its 
Beacon service, which had automatically repurposed user posts 
intended only for limited circulation as advertising for the products 
and services that users happened to mention; in 2011, Google paid 
$8.5 million to settle claims arising from the rollout of its Google Buzz 
social networking service, which used users’ Gmail contacts to 
populate their publicly visible profiles.129 Both awards received 
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widespread media coverage and seemed large in absolute terms, but 
they were minimal relative to the number of individuals affected and 
more minimal still when measured against the profits resulting from 
the challenged activity.130 Both awards, moreover, accompanied 
agreements in which the platform firms promised to do more to 
educate consumers about their practices and to redesign their 
procedures for obtaining consent, but not to halt the challenged 
practices entirely. Settlements such as these are widely regarded as 
having produced almost no meaningful change in business practices 
relating to the collection, processing, and exchange of consumer 
personal information. Suits against information platforms under other 
kinds of statutes — for example, class actions by Uber passengers 
alleging deceptive safety-related marketing and by Uber drivers 
alleging that they are employees entitled to reimbursement for fuel 
and maintenance expenses — have begun to follow similar patterns.131 
Copyright infringement lawsuits are a partial exception to these 
stories of displacement, deflection, and minimization of claims of 
platform-related injury. Platforms have won many of the reported 
cases, but those victories have not come quickly or easily. Instead, 
litigation over such matters as the adequacy of takedown procedures, 
the triggers for indirect infringement liability, and the interplay 
between indirect infringement theories and the statutory safe harbors 
has required courts to explore and evaluate platform operations in 
detail.132 In light of the discussion in Part II.D, above, that should 
 
2010, 12:19 AM), https://nyti.ms/2sOTSNJ; Miguel Helft, Critics Say Google Invades 
Privacy with New Service, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2010), https://nyti.ms/2k8g2Gg; David 
Kravets, Judge Approves $9.5 Million Facebook ‘Beacon’ Award, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2010, 
2:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/03/facebook-beacon-2; Ryan Singel, Facebook 
Beacon Tracking Program Draws Privacy Lawsuit, WIRED (Aug. 14, 2008, 1:48 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2008/08/facebook-beacon. 
 130 For discussion of this point and detailed analysis of several recent settlements, see 
generally Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Enforcing Privacy Rights: Class Action 
Litigation and the Challenge of Cy Pres, in ENFORCING PRIVACY (David Wright & Paul De 
Hert eds., 2015). To similar effect, remedial orders resolving class claims for injunctive 
or declaratory relief tend to be very narrowly drawn. See, e.g., In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 
308 F.R.D. 577, 601 (N.D. Cal. 2015); David Kravets, The Most Absurd Internet Privacy 
Class-Action Settlement Ever, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 30, 2016, 11:55 AM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/08/the-most-absurd-internet-privacy-class-
action-settlement-ever. 
 131 See Sam Levin, Uber Lawsuits Timeline: Company Ordered to Pay Out $161.9m Since 
2009, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2016/apr/13/uber-lawsuits-619-million-ride-hailing-app; Uber Lawsuit Settlement, 
CLASSACTION.COM, https://www.classaction.com/uber/settlement/#uber-settlements (last 
visited June 7, 2017). 
 132 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
  
184 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:133 
come as no particular surprise; the balance of power between platform 
firms and the major copyright industries is still evolving. Even here, 
however, the trajectory has begun to bend away from the courts. 
Copyright litigation between the major industry players can be 
prolonged and expensive — litigation between Viacom and Google 
over infringing videos on YouTube dragged on for seven years — and 
both sides face considerable downside risk.133 And so it also should 
come as no particular surprise that major litigation between platforms 
and copyright interests has become much rarer and compromises 
based on platform self-regulation more common. 
B. Now You See Me, Now You Don’t: Platforms and the Administrative 
State 
Platforms have developed equally powerful strategies for avoiding 
regulatory accountability. Like the courts, the administrative state — 
still comprised principally of models and constructs developed in the 
context of the industrial economy — is poorly equipped to address the 
challenges now confronting it.134 Platforms have proved adept both at 
practicing regulatory arbitrage and at resisting or coopting attempts to 
extend new kinds of regulatory oversight to their core information 
processing operations. As before, they have leveraged the logics of 
performative enclosure, productive appropriation, and expressive 
immunity and the distributive baselines suggested by those logics to 
ensure that their operations have remained largely invisible to 
regulatory oversight. 
Some of the most visible and heated disputes about platforms and 
the administrative state are the least complicated. For example, 
regimes regulating labor and transportation employ definitional 
gateways — e.g., “employer” and “employee” or “taxi” and 
“limousine” — to determine which entities are subject to their 
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requirements.135 High-profile, platform-based “disruptors” of existing 
work arrangements — including labor-matching sites like Mechanical 
Turk and TaskRabbit and transportation-matching sites like Uber and 
Lyft — argue that such regimes do not apply to them. Calling 
themselves information businesses rather than, for example, 
temporary employment agencies or transportation businesses, they 
insist that, except for the people they hire to write their code and 
conduct their government relations operations, they do not actually 
employ anyone. Their true business, they argue, is innovation; they 
are simply bringing surplus production capacity online and into a 
new, freelancer-driven economy that is nimbler, more cost-effective, 
and less impersonal.136 In some ways, that characterization is accurate; 
platforms recruit user-workers into arrangements that are styled as 
licenses to access the platform’s resources. As critics have detailed, 
however, provisions in those licenses cover matters more commonly 
addressed in employment agreements.137 And platforms’ self-interested 
description of their operations is incomplete; they are also structures 
for converting the labor of user-workers and their customers into 
flows of monetizable data and finance capital. The logics of 
performative enclosure, productive appropriation, and expressive 
immunity work to make these functions seem both less salient and 
less important from a regulatory standpoint. 
Platforms also benefit from other kinds of regulatory arbitrage that 
are potentially far more intractable, because they involve divisions of 
authority that are baked into the structure of the modern 
administrative state. The point is most usefully illustrated with an 
extended example involving the ongoing dispute over whether to 
impose a mandate of “net neutrality” — the obligation to “treat all 
content, sites, and platforms equally”138 — on broadband Internet 
access providers. Regulatory authority over the group of actors whose 
actions shape the neutrality or non-neutrality of networked 
 
 135 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (“employer” 
and “employee”); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 31, § 9901 (2017) (“taxicab” and “black car”); 
N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 19-502 (2014) (“taxi” and “black car”).  
 136 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 110, at 96-101; Steven Hill, Uber and Lyft’s Big New Lie: 
Their Excuse for Avoiding Regulation Is Finally Falling Apart, SALON (Jan. 16, 2016, 12:59 
PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/01/16/uber_and_lyfts_big_new_lie_their_excuse_for_ 
avoiding_regulation_is_finally_falling_apart. 
 137 See Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time” Workforce: On-Demand 
Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 471, 485-89 (2016). 
 138 Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQ, TIMWU.ORG, http://www.timwu.org/network_ 
neutrality.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).  
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information environments is both hobbled by outdated legislative 
framing and fragmented by obsolete institutional design. 
Important aspects of the net neutrality dispute are artifacts of 
outdated statutory grants of authority. The last set of major 
amendments to the statutory framework granting the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) authority to regulate 
“telecommunications” dates from 1996, a year in which Internet 
services were still-emergent and not yet understood as central 
components of modern communications architecture and policy.139 
Initially, the FCC classified cable broadband services as information 
services under the statute, but after the D.C. Circuit ruled that the 
statute did not permit imposition of nondiscrimination obligations on 
such services and invalidated an initial set of net neutrality rules, it 
recharacterized broadband Internet access providers as common 
carriers subject to regulation under a different title of the statute and 
then issued new rules.140 The parts of the statute that regulate 
designated common carriers, however, were designed for basic 
telephone service; common carriers must route all calls to their 
destinations without blocking or playing favorites.141 The telephone-
based communications paradigm is too narrow to encompass all of the 
service-related questions that digital networked communications raise. 
Internet access providers routinely engage in traffic management for a 
diverse set of purposes ranging from network optimization to spam 
control to network security, and some network uses require higher 
bandwidth than others. Commercial Internet access providers typically 
have defined tiers of pricing based on network speed and data usage 
rather than on the services consumers plan to use, but also have 
experimented by selectively slowing or prioritizing traffic in ways that 
serve their own narrower interests.142 Net neutrality regulation takes 
 
 139 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 47 U.S.C.). 
 140 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invalidating the 
antiblocking and nondiscrimination rules in In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 
F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010)); Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 
19,738, 19,738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 1, 8, & 20). As of this 
writing, the Trump-era FCC is poised to reverse the 2015 rules if it can. 
 141 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 202(a) (2012). 
 142 See, e.g., Ingrid Burrington, How Mobile Carriers Skirt Net-Neutrality Rules, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/not-everyone-
can-use-the-cloud-equally/421209; Adam Liptak, Verizon Blocks Messages of Abortion Rights 
Group, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2nDEKE4; John D. McKinnon & 
Thomas Gryta, YouTube Says T-Mobile Is Throttling Its Video Traffic, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 
2015, 5:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/youtube-says-t-mobile-is-throttling-its-
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aim at the latter sort of conduct, but needs to say something about the 
former sort and to provide guidelines for distinguishing between the 
two. The statute provides no help, and the complexity of the project 
multiplies opportunities for rent-seeking. 
The topic of net neutrality also intersects with questions about both 
justifiable price discrimination and required public provision of 
essential services in ways that allow the logics of performative 
enclosure and productive appropriation to find points of entry. From 
the Internet access provider’s perspective, the ability to discriminate 
among different types of network traffic facilitates efforts to assert 
control over the collection and use of personally identifying 
information about subscribers and their online activities. The logics of 
performative enclosure and productive appropriation reinforce 
arguments framing such discrimination as a business necessity. With 
regard to essential services, the FCC has long overseen a program to 
offer “lifeline” telephone service to the poorest consumers, and more 
recently oversaw development of a parallel “essentials” program for 
basic broadband Internet access.143 At least some wireless Internet 
providers, however, would prefer to handle the essential-services 
problem via the practice of zero rating, in which usage of a designated 
suite of applications is not counted for billing purposes. Such 
arrangements — which, from the provider perspective, represent a 
permutation of the access-for-data bargain — are more affordable, but 
they are not neutral.144 The telephone-based communications 
 
video-traffic-1450821730; Kevin J. O’Brien, Putting the Brakes on Web-Surfing Speeds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), https://nyti.ms/2sOOvyb; Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to Pay 
Comcast for Smoother Streaming, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:47 PM), https://www.wsj. 
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Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2007, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101900842. 
html; Why Free Can Be a Problem on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), 
https://nyti.ms/1kVnEw4; Edward Wyatt, AT&T Accused of Deceiving Smartphone 
Customers with Unlimited Data Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), https://nyti.ms/ZYXrSz. 
 143 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.101-54.1310 (2016); FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, LIFELINE AND 
LINK UP REFORM AND MODERNIZATION 2-4 (2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/FCC-16-38A1.pdf. But see Press Release, Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, On the 
Future of Broadband in the Lifeline Program (Mar. 29, 2017), https://apps.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-344129A1.pdf (asserting that states have principal 
responsibility for designating providers). 
 144 See In re Wireless Telecomms. Bureau Policy Report, 32 FCC Rcd. 1093 (2017), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0203/DA-17-127A1.pdf; 
FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, POLICY REVIEW OF MOBILE 
BROADBAND OPERATORS’ SPONSORED DATA OFFERINGS FOR ZERO RATED CONTENT AND SERVICES 
(2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/release-report-policy-review-mobile-zero-rating-
practices; Klint Finley, The FCC OK’s Streaming for Free — but Net Neutrality Will Pay, 
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paradigm also does not easily encompass these types of questions. An 
ideal enabling statute for the modern FCC would acknowledge the full 
range of considerations that attend the provision of Internet access 
and provide guidance on how to weigh them. 
More fundamentally still, the current regulatory structure does not 
permit any regulator to consider the full group of actors whose 
activities determine the neutrality or nonneutrality of access to 
networked digital communications capabilities. The FCC-issued rules 
applied straightforwardly to broadband and wireless Internet 
providers, with some exceptions for certain voice-over-Internet 
services, and not at all to platforms like Facebook and Twitter that do 
not provide Internet access.145 If the question is whether an entity 
provides telecommunications services of the general sort contemplated 
by Congress in the most recent iteration of the statute, those 
distinctions may make sense; if the question is whether platforms’ self-
interested mediation of the networked information environment ought 
to be subject to some basic nondiscrimination obligations, they seem 
both arbitrary and laughable. Platforms and their government relations 
firms have exploited the apparent unfairness; for example, Google has 
adopted the posture of a supplicant seeking nondiscriminatory access 
to connection points for its Google Fiber initiative, even though it and 
other dominant platform firms “already benefit from what are 
essentially internet fast lanes, and this has been the case for years.”146 
Proposals to create a regulatory authority empowered to impose 
comparable neutrality obligations on search providers, meanwhile, 
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have drawn criticism from commentators all along the political 
spectrum.147 
A final group of problems involves platform conduct that is simply 
intractable using conventional regulatory methodologies. Debates 
about the need for antitrust oversight of platform-based environments 
are one example. As we saw in Part I, the economics of two-sided 
markets differ in important ways from those of traditional, one-sided 
markets. Because platforms can define terms for each user group 
separately, pricing is not a reliable sign of market power in two-sided 
markets, and secondary heuristics such as the competition regulator’s 
basic distinction between horizontal and vertical integration strategies 
also do not translate well to the platform-based environment. The 
complexity and opacity of platform-based, massively-intermediated 
exchange structures have stymied courts and policymakers used to 
working with more traditional economic models.148 Competition 
regulators in the European Union, who have tangled more aggressively 
with the dominant platform firms, have made more progress toward 
developing new methodologies for determining when platform-related 
advantages ripen into market harms.149 
 
 147 See generally Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? 
Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 
(2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an 
Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697 (2010); James Grimmelmann, 
Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 48 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal. 
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401, 401-02 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010) (“I now see that [our article,] 
Federal Search Commission, like many other parts of the search engine accountability 
literature, tried too hard to shoehorn a wide variety of social concerns about search 
engines into the economic language of antitrust policy. It is now time for scholars and 
activists to move beyond the crabbed vocabulary of competition law to develop a 
richer normative critique of search engine dominance.”). 
 148 For discussions of the difficulties that attend antitrust modeling of two- and 
multi-sided markets and reviews of the literature, see generally Evans & Schmalensee, 
supra note 32; Khan, supra note 33; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 32. 
 149 See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google 
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to 
Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
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Search Results, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/ 
technology/gmail-ads.html?mcubz=3. See generally Martens, supra note 35. 
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An even thornier example of methodological intractability involves 
rules intended to ensure that flows of information about the goods, 
services, and capabilities on offer are accurate and unbiased — for 
example, rules for consumer protection and investor protection and 
rules prohibiting invidious discrimination in employment, finance, 
and housing markets. Such rules are premised on the assumptions that 
information is scarce and costly to obtain and convey, and that 
regulatory mandates therefore can produce meaningful changes in the 
nature and quality of information available to or about market 
participants. The platform-based environment, however, is 
characterized by both information abundance and endemic 
information asymmetry. Those conditions make information-forcing 
rules easy to manipulate and information-blocking rules easy to evade. 
For example, to enforce existing antidiscrimination laws effectively, 
the various agencies with enforcement authority need the ability to 
detect and prove discrimination, yet that task is increasingly difficult 
when decisions about lending, employment, and housing are made via 
complex algorithms used to detect patterns in masses of data and the 
data itself reflects preexisting patterns of inequality.150 Consumer 
protection regulators typically seek both to require disclosure of 
material information and to prevent marketing practices that are 
unfair or deceptive, but within platform environments, consumer 
awareness is easy to manipulate more directly, and many goods and 
services are amenable to versioning using price discrimination 
frameworks designed to appeal to what is known or inferred about 
consumer preferences.151 
These are genuinely difficult problems; the existing regulatory 
toolkit is poorly adapted for scrutinizing algorithmic models and 
methods, and the techniques for machine learning and artificial 
intelligence on which platforms increasingly rely are even less 
amenable to explanation and oversight.152 But encounters between 
 
 150 See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
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platforms and regulators also have been profoundly shaped by tacit 
understandings of the baseline entitlements that platforms enjoy. 
According to the logic of productive appropriation, it makes sense that 
unfettered information processing should be the default and 
restrictions the exception. According to the logics of performative 
enclosure and expressive immunity, the idea of accountability for 
modern “information laboratories” is easy to frame as unjust and its 
advocates as petulant whiners.153 These now-habitual ways of framing 
regulatory discussion militate in favor of governance according to 
voluntary, “best practice” standards and diminish the incentive to 
develop new and appropriately rigorous methods of public 
oversight.154 
C. Your Laws Have No Meaning Here: Platforms and Fundamental 
Rights 
For some commentators on the emerging platform economy, the 
prospect of continued and ever more severe regulatory destabilization 
is a joyous one — a necessary period of disruption en route to a more 
perfectly free (and substantially deregulated) digital future. Although 
many digital entrepreneurs and pundits self-identify as iconoclasts, 
that view of the digital networked world has become their own version 
of conventional and unquestioned wisdom. Writing at the dawn of the 
digital era, self-appointed cyber-philosopher John Perry Barlow 
proclaimed cyberspace to be a new domain of pure freedom. 
Addressing the nations of the world, he proclaimed: “Your legal 
concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do 
not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter 
here.”155 In the era of the platform, that statement has proved 
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prescient in a way that Barlow perhaps did not intend. The “legal 
concepts” that increasingly have no meaning in online environments 
include the guarantees that supposedly protect the fundamental rights 
of Internet users, including the expressive and associational freedoms 
whose supremacy Barlow asserted. 
Within domestic and international discourses about fundamental 
rights, the paradigmatic legal guarantees are those that bind sovereign 
states in their dealings with their own citizens. State-centered 
conceptions of protection and enforceability sit uneasily alongside a 
reality in which flows of information to, from, and about network 
users are intermediated by privately owned and operated information 
platforms, and in which those flows as a practical matter define those 
individuals’ expressive, associational, and commercial experiences and 
opportunities. 
Concern about the unaccountability of private economic power is a 
longstanding theme within human rights scholarship and activism. In 
2008, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a Special 
Representative to supervise the development of a framework and a set 
of guiding principles intended to nudge multinational corporations 
toward behavior more consistent with existing human rights norms.156 
The United Nations also has sponsored a series of special reports 
dealing with the power of information intermediaries and the threats 
that counterterrorism efforts pose to fundamental rights and 
liberties.157 Guiding principles and special reports have no 
independent legal force, however, and the reports have served only to 
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underscore the extent of the disconnect. Within U.S. constitutional 
discourse, matters are even more complicated because platform firms 
also are conceptualized as rights-bearing entities, sheltered from the 
full weight of accountability for their users’ rights by the logic of 
expressive immunity described in Part II.C.158 
In the wake of the Snowden revelations about the U.S.-driven 
cooptation of privately operated networked communication 
infrastructures for mass surveillance, the power of information 
platforms has become a topic of broader concern. As noted in Part 
II.D, above, a coalition of platform firms, academics, and human rights 
NGOs, had earlier founded the Global Network Initiative in an 
attempt both to counter censorship demands made by certain 
countries and to respond to criticisms levied at platforms for acceding 
to such demands. The initiative’s website proudly proclaims: “Privacy 
is a human right and guarantor of human dignity. Privacy is important 
to maintaining personal security, protecting identity and promoting 
freedom of expression in the digital age.”159 The documents leaked by 
Snowden, however, revealed both traditional telecommunications 
providers and platform firms to be essential participants in ongoing 
and seemingly lawless government surveillance operations. 
Post-Snowden, platform firms have worked hard to restore and 
burnish their civil libertarian public personae, filing lawsuits to 
challenge government production requests and developing a “warrant 
canary” system to circumvent the gag orders that customarily 
accompany such requests.160 Unquestionably, that resistance 
sometimes has helped to frame questions about the legality of such 
operations for judicial and legislative review. Some academic 
commentators now argue that communications platforms — 
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“surveillance intermediaries,” to borrow Alan Rozenshtein’s 
terminology — fulfill an important separation of powers function 
without which the potential for surveillance abuses by the state would 
be far greater.161 Others, more skeptical, observe that platforms 
challenge only a very small number of the orders they receive.162 
Even as the idea of “surveillance intermediaries” surfaces one set of 
important dynamics surrounding the conduct of surveillance 
operations, moreover, it persistently obscures others. Platform firms 
are intermediaries for government surveillance, but they are also 
surveillance principals in their own right. So, for example, Google has 
led the industry campaign against government information collection 
via secret national security letters, but also has continued to amass a 
formidable database linking Gmail users to their Internet activities and 
Android users to their geographic movements and mobile device usage 
patterns, and it has pursued a series of ventures in artificial 
intelligence — ranging from digital assistants to smart thermostats to 
portable virtual reality headsets — designed to extend its reach into 
other areas of users’ lives.163 Its decision to stop scanning the contents 
of emails sent and received within Gmail — initially in response to 
demands by paying corporate “G Suite” clients seeking better security 
for their own secrets — leaves its other surveillance initiatives in 
place.164 Facebook offers securely encrypted chat via its WhatsApp 
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service but also has repurposed user “likes” as product and event 
advertising, provided facial recognition technology to help users tag 
friends and acquaintances in photos uploaded by others, and 
manipulated its news feed to study and monetize users’ emotional 
responses.165 As described in Part I.E, above, the massive advertising 
ecosystems constructed by Google and Facebook, with their capacity 
for automated, personalized targeting and their corresponding 
amenability to gaming and manipulation, have contributed 
importantly to the contemporary climate of political polarization and 
distrust. Apple has offered secure end-to-end encryption for text 
messages sent via its iMessage service and for users’ emails, photos, 
and contact lists, but collects a wide range of other information about 
iPhone users and about users of its MacOS operating system, and it 
has implemented technology to enable push notifications to iPhone 
owners from merchants whose establishments they happen to be 
passing.166 Amazon’s natural language-based digital assistant, Alexa, 
offers users comprehensive management of their online searches, 
transactions, and entertainment experiences.167 
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At no point have these and other platform companies publicly 
acknowledged the extent to which their own commercial interests and 
behaviors make them complicit in the construction of the surveillance 
society in which their customers now find themselves enmeshed. To 
the contrary, when policymakers and commentators attempt to direct 
attention to the ways that the platform business model undermines 
user rights and amplifies organized hate and political dysfunction, 
platforms are quick to invoke the logics of appropriative privilege and 
expressive immunity. In the United States, those logics now dominate 
regulatory and policy discussions about online privacy and freedom of 
expression. In European legal and policy debates, where those logics 
are more actively contested, platform firms have worked hard to shift 
the dominant frameworks in their favor. So, for example, Google 
bitterly criticized the initial articulations of the “right to be forgotten” 
by jurists and officials. Relying heavily on the trope of the information 
laboratory as an engine of neutral truth production, it characterized 
takedown requests as efforts to subtract information from the 
historical record, making the remaining information less authentic and 
complete.168 In the media, it also pursued a strategy of widely 
publicizing the inevitable outrageous requests while barely 
acknowledging the many legitimate ones.169 Reading the headlines, 
one would not understand that both the European Court of Justice 
and the European Commission had clearly articulated the need to 
consider public interests in freedom of speech and access to 
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information, and also had carefully distinguished between linking and 
indexing by search engines and archiving by originating sites.170 
While resisting greater formal control by courts and legislatures, 
platform companies also have invoked the logics of performative 
enclosure and fiat interdiction to justify their own restructuring of 
information flows. By the time the first wave of debates about 
delinking and erasure began to fade, Google itself had put in place 
proprietary takedown procedures that performed the very same role it 
had claimed was both impossible and unwise.171 Emerging public 
relations and governance strategies being developed by Facebook and 
Google for responding to the spread of “fake news,” organized hate, 
malicious manipulations of the online advertising ecosystem, and 
terrorist content seem poised to follow a similar path.172 
To similar effect, two of the principal strategies that have been 
deployed to check national security surveillance simply shift the 
balance of surveillance power in favor of privately operated 
communications platforms. This first strategy involves control over 
data retention. Post-Snowden, Congress enacted legislation narrowing 
the government’s authority to request production of 
telecommunications metadata, requiring such requests to be 
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structured by appropriately defined selectors and effectively banning 
bulk collection.173 Self-evidently, the amendments do not limit 
communications providers’ power to collect and retain data for their 
own purposes, but rather depend on their continuing to do exactly 
that. The year beforehand, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
had invalidated a European Union directive mandating data retention 
by telecommunications providers, ruling that the mandate imposed a 
disproportionate burden on citizens’ fundamental rights.174 That 
ruling, however, did not speak directly to purportedly consensual 
platform activities that result in equally comprehensive collection and 
retention of data about users. 
A very different strategy for safeguarding individual rights against 
abusive communications surveillance by state actors involves platform 
provision of strong communications encryption. Notably, strong 
encryption is an increasingly toothless safeguard for individual rights 
against commercial surveillance, so even a complete shift to encrypted 
communications would not disrupt the platform business model 
much, if at all. As we have already seen, that model revolves around 
the application of machine learning techniques to the digital traces of 
people’s activities in real and virtual spaces. Communications data 
provide useful inputs to that process, but those inputs are neither the 
only nor the most important kinds of information on which the 
platform business model relies. To the contrary, within the behaviorist 
framework that animates platform logics, what people say to each 
other matters far less than what they do. Even with strong 
communications encryption, digital traces of what people do remain 
available to the platform provider — location-based information 
collected from mobile devices, sensor-based techniques for tracking 
interest in physical and virtual stimuli, click-through information for 
items in news feeds and social network status updates, DNS level 
information for tracking web browsing, and so on. And network 
architectures constructed for widespread, sensor-based data harvesting 
in turn have affordances that facilitate opportunistic data grabs by 
state actors. 
In sum, networked, platform-based communications architectures 
optimized for data harvesting and predictive modulation of 
information flows leave network users simultaneously exposed to 
pervasive surveillance and cut off from the institutional structures for 
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vindicating the constitutional and human rights that pervasive 
surveillance threatens. Those architectures also entail continuing 
vulnerability to state surveillance. Platform responses to demands for 
surveillance reform have produced meaningful shifts in the balance of 
power, but often have seemed calibrated first and foremost to preserve 
their own authority vis-à-vis threatened intrusions by government 
actors. These developments are combining to constitute the space of 
networked digital communications as a space devoid of protections for 
vital human freedoms, even as the activities conducted in that space 
become more and more fundamental to the exercise of those freedoms. 
D. Resistance Is Futile?: Platforms as Emergent Transnational 
Sovereigns 
The broad scope of the authority that platforms exercise over their 
users and their increasingly robust capacity to resist government 
demands and evade protections for fundamental rights also raise a 
different set of questions, which have to do with the dividing line 
between power and sovereignty. Dominant platforms’ role in the 
international legal order increasingly resembles that of sovereign 
states. And even as they evade the obligations of domestic legal 
regimes, platform firms are actively participating in the ongoing 
construction of new transnational institutions and relationships that 
are more hospitable to their interests. 
It is useful to begin with definitions. Within the Westphalian 
international legal order, a sovereign state is, most minimally, an 
entity with a defined territory and a permanent population, the 
authority to govern its territory, and the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.175 Within that framework, the power of 
transnational corporations to resist state control has become an 
increasingly thorny problem.176 Although such corporations are 
nominally headquartered in particular countries and have physical 
assets in many other countries that are amenable to control in varying 
degrees, their great economic power translates into correspondingly 
powerful capacity for regulatory arbitrage. 
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Dominant platform firms fit within the narrative of the transnational 
corporation as both constrained by and resistant to the international 
legal order, but they also rewrite that narrative in important ways. To 
begin with, platforms have both territories and populations. Platform 
territories are not contiguous physical spaces but rather are defined 
using protocols, data flows, and algorithms. Both technically and 
experientially, however, they are clearly demarcated spaces with 
virtual borders that platforms guard vigilantly.177 The benefits of those 
spaces accrue most visibly and predictably to users who maintain 
permanent and consistent membership. Dominant platforms like 
Facebook, Google, and Apple have user populations that number in 
the billions, vastly eclipsing the populations of all but the largest 
nation states.178 
As to governance authority, the sovereignty of platforms is emergent 
and performative. As we have just seen, platform firms acting in their 
capacity as surveillance intermediaries actively and theatrically resist 
certain kinds of incursions by nation states on their own governance 
authority. In court systems around the world, platforms have 
simultaneously defended against production requests for data stored 
overseas and resisted attempts by governments where that data is 
stored to exert control in the interests of data protection.179 In 
regulatory fora, they have engaged in protracted negotiation with 
competition regulators,180 transportation and labor regulators,181 data 
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protection authorities,182 and tax authorities.183 Although many of 
these controversies also implicate users’ rights of privacy, expression, 
and association, platforms more often seem to be principally 
concerned with establishing their own regulatory independence. 
Speaking at a recent network security conference, Microsoft’s 
president crystallized that ambition, sketching a future in which 
platform firms function as “a trusted and neutral digital 
Switzerland.”184 Several months later, chastising the NSA after a 
powerful hacking exploit that it had developed was stolen and then 
used by cybercriminals, he characterized “nation-state action and 
organized criminal action” as “the two most serious forms of 
cybersecurity threats in the world today.”185 Statements like these, 
which position platforms as conscientious, neutral stewards of the 
global digital infrastructure, set a lofty tone that elevates the more self-
interested processes of strategic positioning operating continually in 
the background. 
At the same time, platforms are unmatched by other transnational 
corporations in the extent of the authority they wield over the day-to-
day experiences and activities of their users. Platforms govern their 
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domains with a quiet tenacity, imposing their own regulatory 
structures on permitted conduct — e.g., sponsored search results, 
Facebook “likes” and “tags,” Twitter retweets — and their own 
internal sanctions on disfavored conduct. They have begun to develop 
more regularized internal codes for handling the latter. As Tarleton 
Gillespie describes, most general purpose platforms ban or limit 
pornography, representations of extreme violence, harassment, hate 
speech, representations of self-harm, and promotion of drug use.186 In 
processes that resemble coordinated lawmaking, they develop and 
share policy guidelines and construct regulatory institutions and 
practices to regularize the processes of content flagging and 
removal.187 
Platforms also increasingly practice diplomacy in the manner of 
sovereign actors. Facebook’s privacy team travels the world meeting 
with government officials to determine how best to satisfy their 
concerns while continuing to advance Facebook’s own interests, much 
as a secretary of state and his or her staff might do.188 Such efforts 
recently bore unprecedented fruit when Denmark announced the 
appointment of a digital ambassador whose portfolio focuses on 
relations with the giant platform companies. That decision in turn may 
inform discussions now underway in various other European settings 
about the desirability of appointing new government “digital 
ministers.”189 
Last and notably, platforms speak with increasingly independent 
voices in new transnational governance settings that play increasingly 
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important roles in the emergent global legal order. Those settings, 
which include world trade negotiations and proceedings conducted by 
Internet standard-setting bodies, are themselves harbingers of 
institutional change.190 In such settings, therefore, the role of 
platforms in the emergent global legal order is doubly under 
construction. 
CONCLUSION: FUTURE-PROOFING LAW DOES NOT MEAN WHAT YOU 
THINK IT MEANS 
In his closing remarks at the symposium that gave rise to the articles 
in this volume, Professor Anupam Chander used an analogy to the 
process of “baby-proofing” a home to raise an important question 
about the meaning of the term “future-proofing”: Do the stairway 
gates, table bumpers, electric socket covers, and so on protect the baby 
from the house or the house from the baby? Does the idea of “future-
proofing” law refer to a need to protect the (bright, shiny) future from 
the (presumptively obsolete) legal system? Or, does it refer to a need 
to protect the (precious and now-jeopardized) rule of law from the 
(rapacious, continually-accelerating) future? 
In both cases, neither answer is quite right. The process of baby-
proofing a home changes the lived experience of the baby, the family, 
and ultimately of society. It engenders new industrial production 
practices, new markets, and new cross-border trade flows organized 
around producing and distributing an ever-growing array of essential-
until-disposable plastic products, which accumulate in landfills and in 
the farthest reaches of the ocean. It calls forth tot-sized car seats 
bulked up like mini Sherman tanks and demands ever larger vehicles 
that can accommodate multiple units in the back seat(s). It replaces 
vigilance with architecture — and engenders different kinds and 
patterns of risk-taking. A technology studies scholar would say that 
practices of baby-proofing produce new actor-networks — new 
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sociotechnical formations that subtly rearrange the relationships 
among their participants, with ramifications that extend more broadly 
and deeply than we might assume.191 
So too for law in the platform-based economy. The uncoordinated 
patterns of self-interested, strategic intervention by platform firms are 
producing new legal-institutional formations optimized to their 
various projects and goals. In broadest brush, this is as it should be; 
legal institutions should change to meet the demands of the times, and 
so it is only logical that the ascendancy of platforms should produce 
new legal relationships and new institutional settlements. But the 
details matter — and even details that seem small or not worth 
remarking can engender profound systemic effects. 
The full account of law’s accommodation to the informational 
economy is yet to be written, and the Polanyian analogy suggests an 
important stage still to come. As Polanyi detailed, the human costs of 
the shift to industrialism ultimately elicited a protective 
“countermovement” in the form of regulatory constraints on market 
processes.192 Whether the shift to an informational, platform-based 
economy will elicit a comparable protective countermovement is yet to 
be seen; it is clear, however, that the platform has become a principal 
vector of institutional destabilization and that some important human 
costs are beginning to materialize. 
The questions now on the table concern the best paths for 
institutional evolution — and the extent to which legal institutions 
should bend to the service of emergent economic power. Those 
questions matter urgently. Law for the platform economy is being 
written all around us; it is time to pay attention. 
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